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THE SUPREME COURT AND RACE DISCRIMINATION,
1967-1991: THE VIEW FROM THE MARSHALL PAPERS
MARK V. TUSHNET"
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and historians agree that almost everything we need
to know about constitutional law is found in the Supreme
Court's published opinions. Internal Court documents, like Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall's papers, tell us something about the
dynamics within the Court but relatively little about constitu-
tional law. The fact that the final published opinion dramatically
departs from the initial draft, for example, may be interesting as
part of the Supreme Court's history but holds little of interest
for the study of constitutional law.'
Historians, though, can use internal Court documents to pro-
vide a "thicker" description of the Court's conduct than the pub-
lished opinions alone make possible. In this Article, I argue that
the Supreme Court's treatment of race discrimination cases dur-
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Georgetown University Law Center.
B.A., Harvard College 1967; J.D., M.A., Yale University, 1971.
1. For example, Justice Rehnquist's first draft in United States Postal Serv. v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), attempted to develop a general approach to the Title
VII ban on race discrimination in employment that would have distinguished be-
tween white-collar and blue-collar positions, giving employers more latitude as to the
former. Justice Rehnquist, Draft Opinion (United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens) (Dec.
9, 1982), in Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, box 317, file 5 [herein-
after Marshall Papers]. Justice Marshall circulated a dissent stating that such a
distinction would be "untenable" and "unwieldy." Justice Marshall, Draft Opinion
(United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens) (Jan. 11, 1983), Marshall Papers, box 317, file
5 at 1 & n.1. Justice Rehnquist's opinion failed to gain a majority, and in March he
recirculated what he called an "alternate draft" with an entirely different theory,
limiting itself to the facts of the case. Justice Rehnquist, Draft Opinion (United
States Postal Serv. v. Aikens) (Mar. 13, 1983), Marshall Papers, box 317, file 5.
That draft became the published opinion. I doubt that any employment dis-
crimination lawyer would find it significant that in 1983 some Justices c6nsidered a
white-collar/blue-collar distinction before ultimately abandoning it. Perhaps had the
information been available in 1984 it might have affected how some arguments were
made, but surely not today.
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ing Justice Marshall's tenure had two characteristics. The pub-
lished opinions are sufficient to identify the first: that the period
should be divided into two sub-parts, an era focusing on defining
violations of the anti-discrimination principle and general reme-
dies for such violations, and an era focusing on affirmative ac-
tion, a more specific remedy.
Identifying the second characteristic, though, requires an in-
vestigation of Justice Marshall's papers. That investigation re-
veals that the race discrimination cases were divisive but not
contentious.2 In other words, the Court was frequently quite
divided, and fundamentally so, in these cases, but the votes
were quite firm, and the losers-ordinarily Justice Marshall and
other liberals-accepted their losses without escalating tensions
within the Court.' The liberal Justices kept the atmosphere
friendly because, while recognizing that their opponents were
changing race discrimination law somewhat and that the Court's
new composition made such changes inevitable, they believed
that neither the amount nor the pace of change was too great.
Before developing those two arguments, I should note several
limitations of the data on which I rely. First, and most obvious,
the information comes from the papers of one of the Court's
liberal Justices.4 During Marshall's tenure, nearly all of the
Court's internal documents were circulated to all the chambers.
Occasionally, however, Marshall's papers include drafts circulat-
ed only to a few Justices. Something similar may have happened
among the conservative Justices, but the presently available
materials do not establish that fact.
Second, it is important to distinguish between significant
information revealed by the internal documents and what should
2. In this regard, race discrimination cases differed from capital punishment
cases, which were both divisive and contentious. Developing that contrast, however,
would exceed the scope of this Article.
3. One important qualification should be noted and developed later. Chief Justice
Warren Burger was not infrequently inept as a manager of cases within the Court.
At times Burger's conduct occasioned tension, but the tension was associated far
more with Burger's conduct than with the fact that it occurred specifically in a race
discrimination case.
4. Justice William J. Brennan's papers are available with his permission, but I
have not consulted them for this Article. They too, of course, come from a liberal
Justice.
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be regarded as the ordinary "noise" associated with transforming
first drafts into published opinions. Most of the time, when the
second draft contains changes, even changes suggested by an-
other Justice, the changes are simply noise. The author may
have overlooked a point that another Justice thought important
enough to include, or a Justice may have put an argument in a
way that another Justice thought less clear than it could be.
These changes should not be viewed as highly significant. The
risk of doing so is exacerbated when one examines only a single
topic as I do in this Article. Only by noticing that quite similar
changes occur in tax or admiralty cases can we understand that
the changes in the race discrimination cases do not tell us any-
thing important about that class of cases.5
Finally, a more complex issue, which I have discussed in more
detail elsewhere,6 concerns the Justices' jurisprudence. Particu-
larly in the 1980s, a fair amount of the Justices' correspondence
dealt with suggestions by one Justice to another that some
words or phrases in a draft opinion be modified slightly.' Those
5. A good example is Melvin Urofsky's fine study of Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A CONFLIcT OF RIGHTS: THE Su-
PREiMiE COURT AND AFFIImATIVE AcTION (1991). Urofsky, who used the Brennan Pa-
pers, shows how Justice Brennan's draft opinion received critical comments from
Justices O'Connor and Powell. The comments pointed in different directions:
O'Connor's comments would have weakened the opinion (from Justice Brennan's
point of view), while Powell's could be accommodated in ways that would have
strengthened it (again from Brennan's point of view). Id. at 163-64. When Justice
O'Connor circulated an opinion indicating that she understood Brennan's draft to
support her position, Brennan added a footnote disclaiming that point. Id. at 165-66.
She then withdrew her concurrence in his opinion, and the published opinions re-
flected the state of the exchange. Id. at 166-67. Urofsky does not overemphasize the
significance of the changes he discusses; they resulted from ordinary discussions
within the Court, and the fact that Justice Brennan changed his opinion, first to
gain Powell's assent and then to respond to O'Connor, does not tell us anything
significant about the Court's treatment of discrimination issues.
6. Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall As Republican Lawyer, Address at the An-
nual Meeting of the American Society for Legal History, Memphis, Tenn. (Oct. 21,
1993) (copy on file with the William and Mary Law Review).
7. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia frequently made what he once called a
"suggestion to forestall future litigation." Letter, from Justice Scalia to Justice
Blackmun (Feb. 19, 1987), Marshall Papers, box 412, file 8. Another more typical
example is Scalia's suggestion that the phrase "the employer certainly will know," be
changed to "the employer generally will know with tolerable certainty," a change
that preserved the possibility that lower courts might, in appropriate cases, recognize
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who make such suggestions, and those who take them seriously,
have a jurisprudence in which the precise formulations in Su-
preme Court opinions have significant impact on the arguments
lawyers can make and lower court judges can accept. Other Jus-
tices, including Marshall, had a more pragmatic jurisprudence in
which, as Justice Stevens put it, "the logic of... [an] opinion
will carry the day in all events."8 Such Justices believe that the
Supreme Court can define in broad terms what the Constitution
requires, but the precise meaning of the Court's decisions will be
worked out, not among the Justices, but in the lower courts by
litigants and judges not always sympathetic to the Court's broad
conclusions. To determine whether a change in phrasing is sig-
nificant or merely noise, we need to understand the jurispru-
dence of the opinion's drafter and of any Justice to whom the
drafter was responding.
II. THE ERA OF VIOLATION AND REMEDY
When Thurgood Marshall first joined the Court, one era of
race discrimination law was about to end. The Court had essen-
tially avoided desegregation cases after announcing its "all delib-
erate speed" formula in 1955.' Its hesitation arose in part from
concern over the political limitations on the Court's ability to
insist on substantial desegregation in the deep South, and in
part from Justice Felix Frankfurter's misplaced belief that the
Court could induce desegregation by appealing to the "better"
an employer's good-faith defense that in fact it did not know. Letter from Justice
Scalia to Justice Blackmun (May 8, 1987), Marshall Papers, box 416, file 7. A close
relative is Justice Stevens' change, in response to a suggestion from Chief Justice
Rehnquist, from a standard calling a burden "virtually insurmountable," Letter from
Chief Justice Rehnquist to Justice Stevens (June 1, 1988), Marshall Papers, box 449,
file 9, to one calling it "well-nigh insurmountable." Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414
(1988).
8. Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Marshall (Jan. 3, 1985), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 373, file 10. The case was Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), and Jus-
tice Marshall refused to agree with Chief Justice Warren Burger's suggestion that
the opinion should be explicitly confined to capital cases. Letter from Chief Justice
Burger to Justice Marshall (Dec. 27, 1984), Marshall Papers, box 373, file 10; Letter
from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Marshall (Jan. 8, 1985), Marshall Papers, box
373, file 10.
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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class of white southerners.'0 In the deep South, however, delib-
eration meant inaction.
By the late 1960s the Justices had become impatient with the
deep South's recalcitrance. They also benefited from a changed
political environment: the enactment of major civil rights acts in
1964,11 1965,12 and 1968'" demonstrated that the nation as a
whole now had the political will to support more aggressive ac-
tion against segregation. The 1964 Civil Rights Act, in particu-
lar, gave federal executive officials substantial weapons through
the threat of cutting off federal funds for segregated schools. 4
A. The Underlying Ambiguity in the Law
In Green v. County School Board15 the Court took the first
major step toward active school desegregation, invalidating a
county's freedom-of-choice desegregation plan that allowed stu-
dents to choose the school they wished to attend. 6 While the
plan was in effect, no white students chose to attend the previ-
ously black school, and only fifteen percent of the African-Amer-
ican students chose to attend the previously white schools. 7 Al-
though Justice Hugo Black initially would have upheld the free-
dom-of-choice plan, eventually the Court unanimously invali-
dated it.
18
Green's unanimity concealed serious analytic problems that
later cases brought into the open. The Court had never really
resolved for itself, much less for the lower courts, the meaning of
"desegregation." It could mean the elimination of race as the
10. See Mark Tushnet, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91
COL. L. REV. 1867, 1925-27 (1991).
11. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988)).
12. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)).
13. The Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) (1988).
15. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
16. Id. at 441.
17. Id.
18. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE SU-
PREME COURT 59 (1986).
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basis for pupil assignments, whether that basis was openly stat-
ed or studiously concealed. Or, it could mean the accomplish-
ment of a substantial degree of biracial attendance at public
schools.
One main strategy for passive resistance to desegregation in-
volved adoption of pupil assignment policies, which nominally
assigned students to schools without regard to race.19 As imple-
mented, however, these policies were "gerrymanders," accom-
plishing racial separation without explicitly relying on race. The
Justices came to believe that such facially neutral policies were
merely facades behind which racial discrimination continued.0
The question that arose was whether other responses to the
Court's rulings were similar facades. Green seemed to indicate
they were. The Court held that, even though students nominally
made individual decisions to attend particular schools, the pat-
tern of results showed that the freedom-of-choice plan perpet-
uated race discrimination.21 School boards that had adopted
student assignment plans earlier were not complying with the
Court's requirements in good faith.
Green suggested, though it did not say so openly, that a board
could not adopt a freedom-of-choice plan in the good faith belief
that it satisfied the Constitution, at least when the result of the
plan reproduced the segregated conditions that had existed be-
fore 1954.22 This point could easily be made in the factual set-
ting presented by Green: a school district with only two high
schools, in which students of both races would have attended
both schools in substantial numbers if the school board assigned
students to the schools nearest their homes.2" On this inter-
19. For a discussion of this strategy, see MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 242-56 (1994).
20. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 53-54.
21. Green, 391 U.S. at 441.
22. Id. at 440-41. In a footnote, the Court quoted at length from two U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights reports. Id. at 340 n.5. The quoted material expressed the
Commission's views as to why freedom-of-choice plans produced such poor results in
integrating public schools. See id. The Commission's purported reasons included fear
among blacks of white retaliation, improper influence on black families to keep their
children out of the all-white schools, and economic pressure exerted on blacks by
whites. Id. The Court "neither adopt[ed] nor refuse[d] to adopt" the Commission's
views. Id.
23. See id. at 432 ("There is no racial segregation in the county; persons of both
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pretation of Green, the degree of actual integration was no more
than a signal that racial discrimination still affected school
board decisions. The Court never said, though, that it relied on
the pattern of results to support an inference of bad faith.24
Perhaps the Justices still recalled Justice Frankfurter's belief
that school boards represented the best in the white South and
could be nursed along if the Court expressed enough sympathy
with their problems. With the Court reluctant to talk openly
about bad faith, however, the next step was almost inevitable
(and unobservable): a low degree of actual integration became
not just a signal, but a demonstration that the constitutional
violations continued to occur.
According to Green, the freedom-of-choice plan was a "deliber-
ate perpetuation of the unconstitutional dual system."' School
boards, it said, now had an "affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."26
That duty could be satisfied only by a plan that "prove[d] itself
in operation.""
Justice Black's initial vote in Green was probably the first real
indication that trouble was afoot within the Court. Black had
never believed that white southerners would accept substantial
biracial attendance in schools. He only wanted white southern-
ers to demonstrate their adherence to the constitutional
antidiscrimination norm by acting in good faith to eliminate race
as a basis for public decisions.2" By blurring the line between
using the pattern of results as a basis for inferring a lack of
good faith and using the pattern as a basis for an independent
determination of unconstitutionality, Green posed problems for
Black and, it turned out later, for other Justices.
races reside throughout.").
24. See id. at 438-42.
25. Id. at 438.
26. Id. at 437-38.
27. Id. at 441.
28. See TUSHNET, supra note 19, at 192.
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B. The First Signals of Disagreement
A sensitive reader might observe Black's difficulties emerging
in his draft opinion for the Court in a teacher desegregation
case. Judge Frank Johnson had been dealing with the desegre-
gation case in Montgomery, Alabama, since 1964.' As Justice
Black's opinion said, Judge Johnson continually had to prod the
school board to desegregate: The board "was constantly sparring
for time" while the judge "was constantly urging that no unnec-
essary delay could be allowed." 0 When the case reached the
Supreme Court, the dispute was apparently narrow. Judge John-
son had ordered the board to move toward the goal of having the
ratio of white teachers to African-American teachers in each
school be substantially the same as the ratio of white teachers to
African-American teachers in the school system as a whole."1
The court of appeals had modified this order, objecting to what it
called "fixed mathematical ratios."32 The Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that Judge Johnson did not intend to impose a
"rigid and inflexible" requirement."
Justice Black's opinion for the Court was filled with praise for
the school board. It had shown "a growing recognition... of its
responsibility to achieve integration as rapidly as p;acticable."'
The litigation was, in Black's terms, "an exchange of ideas be-
tween judge and school board officials,"35 and Judge Johnson
"from time to time, found it possible to compliment the board on
its cooperation with him." 6 The residual differences were, Jus-
tice Black wrote, "minor,"37 and "[iit is good to be able to decide
a case with the feelings we have about this one."" Twice in his
draft opinion, though, Justice Black went farther than "two of
29. United States v. Montgomery Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 228 (1969).
30. Id. at 230-31.
31. Id. at 232 (citing Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 289 F. Supp. 647,
654 (M.D. Ala. 1968)).
32. Id. at 234.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 230.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 231.
38. Id. at 236.
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[his] Brethren""9 wanted. Initially he wrote that the school
board "[had] at all times asserted their purpose to bring about a
racially integrated school system,"40 and that the court of ap-
peals "made forceful arguments against rigid or inflexible or-
ders."14 ' The final opinion said only that the board "assert[s]"42
that purpose, thereby eliminating the suggestion that the board
had acted in good faith from 1955 onward. It also said that the
court of appeals made "many arguments" against rigid orders.4"
Justice Black was more willing to find good faith, and more ner-
vous about what school boards could be required to do, than
were some of his colleagues.
Justice Black's unease rested on uncertainty about what the
Court would eventually do about the deep South's recalcitrance.
On the surface, the question was merely about timing. The deep
South had resisted desegregation forcefully, but the time had
come to take action. In 1964, and then later in Green, the Court
phrased the point this way: "The time for mere 'deliberate speed'
has run out." 4 School boards clearly had to do something
now,45 and Green specified what that action should be: Boards
had to propose plans that "promise[d] realistically to work.""
Exactly what constituted a plan that "worked," however, re-
mained unclear.
C. Warren Burger's Impact
The Court's next confrontation with desegregation remedies
saw more strains among the Justices, this time caused by Chief
Justice Warren Burger's inept handling of the Court's work.47
39. Letter from Justice Black to Conference (May 27, 1969), Marshall Papers, Box
56, File 3.
40. Justice Black, Draft Opinion, (United States v. Montgomery Bd. of Educ.)
(May 20, 1969), Marshall Papers, box 56, file 3, at 11.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Montgomery, 395 U.S. at 236.
43. Id. at 234.
44. Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964). The court repeated
this phrase in Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
45. Green, 391 U.S. at 439-41.
46. Id. at 439.
47. The interpretation I offer differs from that promulgated primarily by Bob
Woodward and Scott Armstrong, who present Chief Justice Burger as a manipulative
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Burger, alone, did not cause an irremediable rift among the Jus-
tices, but the changing composition of the Court began to have
its effect.
The issue in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Educa-
tion48 was simply one of timing, not of what sorts of plans
boards had to propose. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
had relied on the 1964 Civil Rights Act to support its desegrega-
tion rulings.49 It endorsed the guidelines developed by the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) for deter-
mining when federal funds could be denied to school districts,
taking them to indicate what the Constitution required as well.
In July 1969, the Fifth Circuit ordered HEW to submit desegre-
gation plans for thirty-three Mississippi school districts that
were to take effect in September of 1969."° The Nixon adminis-
tration, pursuing its southern strategy, moved to delay the
order's effective date. 1 At the end of August the Fifth Circuit
agreed, postponing the submission of plans until December. 2
Because it was unlikely that plans submitted in December could
be implemented in the middle of a school year, this postpone-
ment would have delayed desegregation until September
1970-fifteen years after Brown I.
The civil rights plaintiffs asked Justice Black to override the
Fifth Circuit's last order restoring the September date.13 Be-
and highly political judge, viewed with suspicion by his colleagues. See generally BOB
WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979). Chief Justice Burger, of
course, had more conservative instincts than many of the Justices on the Court
when he arrived, and some of them, at least initially, thought that he was Machia-
vellian. The Justices rather quickly came to understand that Chief Justice Burger's
behavior could best be explained by his inadequacies rather than by imputing po-
litical motives to him, although suspicions cropped up again from time to time.
Woodward and Armstrong's picture of Chief Justice Burger may be unduly influ-
enced by their reliance on law clerks' accounts. Unlike the Justices, law clerks
served for only one term (very rarely two) and tended to see constitutional law in
highly political terms. They were unlikely to form the more nuanced evaluations of
the Chief Justice that their employers could.
48. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
49. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 417 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1969).
50. Id. at 858.
51. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218, 1219 (Black, Cir. J.,
1969).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1219.
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cause the issue was only one of timing, Justice Black was sym-
pathetic. However, writing as a single Justice, Black refused to
overturn the court of appeals' "deplorable" order.' He urged
the plaintiffs to seek review by the full Court, to "do away with
[the 'all deliberate speed' formula] completely."55
The Court granted the plaintiffs' petition for review on Octo-
ber 9 and heard argument in the case only two weeks later.5"
After the argument, Justice Black told his colleagues that he
had always opposed the "all deliberate speed" formula and would
not again endorse it." Black would have insisted on immediate
desegregation. 5 Justice Brennan thought that no more than
two weeks should be allowed for compliance, with desegregation
plans to be submitted immediately,59 while Justice Harlan
would have been even more flexible.60 These were not large dif-
ferences, however.
Chief Justice Burger met with Justices Harlan and White to
block out an order to be released as soon as possible.6 He cir-
culated his first draft on October 26, two days after the Court's
conference. It began with the comment that "the Attorney Gen-
eral [had] urged" ending segregation before the beginning of the
1970 school year.62 Its substance gave the court of appeals until
mid-November to enter its order regarding "interim re-
lief"63 -not much sooner than that court's initial December 1
deadline. The deadline for implementation was vague: "at the
earliest possible time and date" after the court's action.'
Burger's cover note said that he had avoided specifying "any
'outside' date"-that is, a statement that the boards should act
no later than a specified deadline--'because of the risk that it
54. Id. at 1222.
55. Id.
56. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
57. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 69.
58. Id. at 69-70.
59. Id. at 70.
60. Id. at 69.
61. See id. at 70-86 (recounting the Court's deliberations in detail); WOODWARD &
ARMSTRONG, supra note 47, at 49-50.
62. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 71.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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could have overtones which might seem to invite dilatory tac-
tics."65
None of Burger's colleagues thought that he had done what
they wanted, and most of them started to work on separate draft
orders. Justice Harlan objected to the prefatory comment about
the Department of Justice, saying, "I think it undesirable to
blink the fact that the Government stands in opposition to the
central and only issue in the case before us." 66 Justice
Brennan's order would have said that "'all deliberate speed' is no
longer constitutionally permissible," and that the court of ap-
peals should immediately order the necessary steps to achieve
immediate termination of any "dual school system based on race
or color."67 Justice Black prepared a dissent because Burger's
order "revitalize[d] the doctrine of 'all deliberate speed,'" and it
would be "disastrous" to continue "one more day of an unconsti-
tutional dual school system."68 "The time has passed for 'plans'
and promises to desegregate."69
Justice Marshall "attempt[ed] [a] compromise," continuing to
refer to "interim" relief and requiring only "reasonable means for
achieving ... immediate termination."" Marshall's draft,
though, was tighter than Burger's, setting an "outside date" of
December 31, 1969.71 Justice Marshall thought that he could
extract another concession by substituting a date at year's end,
following the traditional winter school vacation, for the require-
ment for "immediate" desegregation-which his colleagues
seemed to think meant desegregation in late October-in ex-
change for a commitment to complete desegregation at a specific
date.
On October 27, the Justices met again. Burger had revised his
proposed order, which now would require desegregation "forth-
65. Id. at 70.
66. Id. at 72.
67. Justice Brennan, Memorandum and Draft Order (Alexander v. Holmes County
Bd. of Educ.) (Oct. 28, 1969), Marshall Papers, box 62, file 1, at 2.
68. Justice Black, Draft Opinion (Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ.) (un-
dated), Marshall Papers, box 62, file 1, at 3-4.
69. Id.
70. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 76.
71. Id.
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with"--the term Marshall had urged the Court to adopt when he
argued Brown II in 1955.72 He retained his comment on the ad-
ministration position, though, which bothered the other Justices.
He promised to circulate another revision, and he did so late the
same afternoon. The Chief Justice was never one to discern sub-
tle differences between his position and those of his colleagues.
His cover note said that he had been helped by Justice
Marshall's draft, "which was very much like what I had initially
submitted." 3 In fact, the proposed order differed significantly
from Marshall's. True, it did repudiate "all deliberate speed."
And it specified that the schools should "begin to operate as a
unitary system"74 in November. However, it omitted Marshall's
trade-off, setting no date for the completion of desegregation. It
also continued to obscure the Department of Justice's position by
saying that the government had "urged that the Respondent's
obligation to desegregate their school systems is immediate and
unqualified."75
Even worse, Burger failed to appreciate that his colleagues
wanted a crisp order, to make it completely clear that the courts
would no longer tolerate any further delays. To convey this mes-
sage, the Justices wanted to issue only an order, with no opin-
ion.76 As Black stated, "There has already been too much writ-
ing and not enough action in this field. Writing breeds more
writing, and more disagreements, all of which inevitably delay
action."77 Despite these expressions, Burger circulated a draft
opinion with the third revised order.
Burger's sense of the case's importance is suggested by the
fact that he proposed to follow the extraordinary procedure in
Cooper v. Aaron,78 the Little Rock school desegregation case, in
which the Court's opinion listed the names of the participating
Justices. He could not have known, of course, that some mem-
bers of the Court had misgivings about that procedure even in
72. Id. at 76-77.
73. Id. at 78.
74. Id. at 81.
75. Id. at 80.
76. See id. at 73.
77. Id. at 73-74.
78. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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Cooper itself 9 His draft opinion was so lame, though, that it
could only have confirmed his colleagues' impression that the
Chief Justice had what could most charitably be called an inflat-
ed sense of his own stature both inside and outside the Court.
Despite the fact that his colleagues wanted a clear endorsement
of immediate desegregation, Burger would have had them say
that "[iin the circumstances we have no doubt that this will
present problems and difficulties""0 because the desegregation
plans were drafted under severe constraints of time and lack of
information. The draft opinion also said that the Justices
"hope[d]" that the "heavy burdens on pupils and teachers alike
will ... be more than offset by the fulfillment now to some of
these pupils of promises long unkept."8 ' The concluding senti-
ment was worth expressing, but the statements about "problems
and difficulties"82 undercut the opinion's rhetorical force; the
draft reads as if the Court were being reluctantly dragged to
endorse immediate desegregation notwithstanding its problems,
rather than as if the Court were finally vindicating fundamental
constitutional rights. Justice Brennan read the draft as an at-
tempt by Burger "to save Nixon" 3 from a confrontation with
the Court. President Nixon, the draft's tone suggested, had cor-
rectly understood how difficult desegregation would be, although
perhaps his administration had ultimately come down on the
wrong side of a difficult question.
Justice Brennan thought that the draft opinion "obscured" the
message that "all deliberate speed" was dead, and Justice Black
objected to specifying any dates at all, believing that dates
would give lawyers the chance to seek delay beyond the deadline
by citing new information not available to the Court and the fact
that no one really believed that desegregation would occur by a
specific date. The best the Court could do, Black believed, was to
use the word "immediate" and leave the rest to the lower
courts.'
79. See TUSHNET, supra note 19, at 264.
80. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 79.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 80.
84. Id. at 81-83.
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Unhappy with Burger's draft, Justice Brennan circulated a
revised order, and Justice Stewart circulated a draft opinion.
Brennan thought that the Court should state its message "in the
briefest and plainest possible words."' His draft order began
with a short statement that desegregation according to 'all de-
liberate speed' is no longer constitutionally permissible. The
obligation of every dual school system is to desegregate now." 6
The court of appeals should have "directed that each school sys-
tem begin immediately to operate as a unitary school system
within which no person is to be barred from any school because
of race or color.""7 These phrases survived into the final order.
Justices Black and Douglas signed on to this draft. Justice
Harlan did as well, although he stated that he would have pre-
ferred to specify an "outside date" as Marshall had, to prevent
"dilatory tactics."'
Justice Stewart's draft opinion said that "further delay...
will not be tolerated,"89 and specified an "outside date" of No-
vember 15, 1969." Not surprisingly, Harlan indicated that he
could join Justice Stewart's opinion. Having counted the votes,
Justice Marshall knew that it was "impossible to get unanimity
on cut-off dates,"9 and on that assumption he was willing to
join Justice Brennan.
Burger, too, could count. He met with Brennan and basically
adopted Brennan's draft, recirculating it under his own name on
the afternoon of October 28. In light of all that had occurred, it
suggests something about Burger's obtuseness that his cover
memorandum stated that the final draft "returns to what I pro-
posed to the Conference except (a) the preamble is altered and
(b) the dates are omitted."92
Although only a few days had passed since oral arguments,
the Justices were now impatient to issue the order. After all,
85. Id. at 82.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 83.
89. Id. at 84.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id- at 84-85.
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what had divided them was a dispute over just how immediate
"immediate" desegregation would have to be, and those who
wanted the schools to begin the process right away thought that
every day of delay undermined their position. Justice Harlan
agreed to the Brennan-Burger revision because the divisions had
been reduced to "pure semantics."93 Both Justices White and
Stewart had "substantial misgivings"9 4 about the order, taking
it to suggest that "all deliberate speed" had been abandoned only
to be replaced by the equally defective standard, "as soon as
possible."95 The Court issued the order on October 29."
Two things stand out about the Court's deliberations in Alex-
ander. The Justices were divided by differences in their under-
standing of what it meant to abandon "all deliberate speed" in
favor of immediate desegregation. On the surface it seemed as if
the differences concerned timing, but underneath they concerned
the meaning of desegregation. Justice Black and Chief Justice
Burger thought that "immediate desegregation" meant doing
something right away to eliminate segregated schools. They re-
jected a cut-off date only in part because they assumed that
school boards would begin to do something at the latest date
possible, the cut-off date. They also rejected a cut-off date be-
cause they knew that when it arrived, plaintiffs would ask what
exactly had been done and were confident that by late 1969 the
patterns of racial attendance at schools would not differ much
from what they were in early 1969, no matter what the school
boards had done. Justice Black's misgivings about Green meant
that he would not be terribly troubled by modest changes in
patterns of racial attendance as long as he was sure that the
school boards had indeed taken some action in good faith.
In contrast, Chief Justice Burger, not having participated in
Green, may have taken it quite seriously. Given Green's appar-
ent insistence on results, the prospect loomed of saying that the
results achieved by "immediate desegregation" were inadequate
and that even more aggressive steps to desegregate would be
93. Id. at 85.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 86.
96. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
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necessary. The Chief Justice, with his sensitivity to the Nixon
administration's legal and political strategy, could not have been
pleased about such prospects.
Justices Harlan and Marshall had the same understanding,
but for them the cut-off date was affirmatively desirable precise-
ly because it would force the Court to face the ambiguities inher-
ent in defining desegregation. They believed that the Constitu-
tion demanded that school boards fully abandon race-based
student assignment and do so in good faith; that is the reason
they went along with Green. They might eventually have divided
over how often a pattern of results demonstrated the existence
of bad faith, but in Alexander that issue was not before them. A
cut-off date meant that "desegregation" had to be completed by a
specified date. When that date arrived, the Court would have to
decide the meaning of desegregation."
Ever the politician, Justice Brennan sought the middle
ground, which in this case meant perpetuating ambiguity. The
differences between Brennan and Burger were largely rhetorical:
how to convey the sense that the Court really did mean "imme-
diate" desegregation even though it did not know what desegre-
gation really meant. In the charged political atmosphere of 1969,
and with the first administration since 1955 asking to slow the
desegregation process, rhetoric mattered. Justice Black's expres-
sions of sympathy with the Montgomery School Board a year
earlier could not be repeated. Indicating even indirectly that the
Court was roughly in line with the Nixon administration's posi-
tion would have meant that "immediate" really meant "some
time soon," and no one except Burger wanted that result.
For all these reasons, the Court's internal discussions of Alex-
ander were rather restrained. In part, this restraint resulted
from the compressed time-frame. With Justices and clerks
churning out one draft in the morning and responding to drafts
from other chambers in the afternoon, little time remained to
97. I believe that Bernard Schwartz misunderstands the Harlan-Marshall position
as one that would have given school boards more time to desegregate than the
Brennan position. SCIvARTZ, supra note 18, at 67-87. Rather, Justices Harlan and
Marshall understood desegregation to be more limited than the more expansive in-
terpretations of Green might suggest, and they believed that desegregation as they
understood it could be completed rather quickly.
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focus on personal relations or feelings. The restraint of the dis-
cussion also occurred partly because the Justices were learning
about Warren Burger's managerial style. When Burger's cover
memoranda repeatedly showed that he failed to understand the
other Justices' concerns they began to believe that he was not a
Machiavellian manipulator seeking to sneak an endorsement of
the Nixon administration's position past his colleagues, but sim-
ply lacked the capacity to understand their concerns.
D. The Emergence-and Submergence-of Real Disagreement
This pattern was to repeat itself, most notably in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education." There the Court
unanimously endorsed extensive transportation reme-
dies-busing-in school desegregation.99 In Alexander, a dis-
pute about the timing of desegregation remedies concealed a
disagreement about the meaning of "desegregation"; in Swann, a
dispute about the scope of those remedies concealed the same
disagreement.
The problem originated with Green. Suppose a board acted in
good faith to eliminate race as a criterion for student assign-
ment, for example, by assigning students to the schools nearest
their homes. In New Kent County such a policy would have led
to substantial integration because residential neighborhoods
were well-integrated. What about a neighborhood school policy
in a system with substantial residential segregation? The easy
solution would have been to find that school boards adopting
such policies were not acting in good faith. However, the history
of neighborhood school policies was so well established that it
would have been a true slap in the face to tell southern school
boards that their prior resistance to desegregation now barred
them from adopting a neighborhood school policy of a sort that
systems throughout the country regarded as educationally
sound.
Green pointed in two directions. One direction was that re-
sults indicated good or bad faith. The other was that results
98. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
99. Id. at 30.
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were the measure of continuing constitutional violations. A
Memphis case, Northcross v. Board of Education,0 0 might have
given the Court a chance to choose between these two meanings.
The district court in Northcross had ordered some additional
student assignment remedies.' °' The plaintiffs sought more ex-
tensive relief from the court of appeals."0 2 That court, however,
refused to grant the relief, finding that the city would achieve a
"unitary system" in which segregation had been completely elim-
inated as soon as it complied with the district court's orders.0 3
Alexander, it said, was therefore inapplicable to Memphis. °4
When the plaintiffs sought Supreme Court review, the initial
vote to grant review was four-to-three.0 5 This count was mis-
leading, though, because only Chief Justice Burger really want-
ed to take the case to clarify Green's meaning. Justices Harlan,
Stewart, and White were uncertain enough that they waited to
see what Justice Brennan might produce. Brennan drafted a
proposed per curiam opinion that vacated the court of appeals'
decision. Adopting a position that would ultimately prove strate-
gically the best the liberals could do as the Court's composition
changed, Justice Brennan focused on the district court's finding
that the system was still segregated. Substantial evidence sup-
ported that finding, he argued, and it should not have been re-
jected by the court of appeals. With such a finding in hand, Alex-
ander remained relevant to Memphis. 0 6
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result, but he was not
satisfied because he still believed that the Court should "clear
up what seems to be a confusion, genuine or simulated," about
the meaning of Green.'0 7 "At some point," he wrote, "we should
resolve some of the basic practical problems including whether
any particular racial balance must be achieved as a constitution-
100. 397 U.S. 232 (1970).
101. Id. at 233.
102. Id. at 234.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 89. Justice Marshall was disqualified because he
had been involved in the case as Solicitor General, and there was one vacancy on
the Court because of Justice Abe Fortas' recent resignation. Id. at 89-90.
106. Id. at 90.
107. Northcross, 397 U.S. at 236.
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al matter, to what extent school districts and zones may or must
be altered and to what extent busing is compelled as a constitu-
tional requirement." °8 As it turned out, his colleagues did not
want to resolve those basic questions in Swann either.
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district was one of the larg-
est in the country as a result of the consolidation of the city and
county districts in 1960. In 1965, only token desegregation had
occurred in the district. Only a handful of African-American
students attended schools with a white majority, and a smaller
handful of whites attended black-majority schools. Prodded by
local activists and concerned about federal pressure, the school
board developed a desegregation plan that would have closed
some African-American schools in the county area, created
neighborhood school assignments, and allowed "freedom of
choice" for students able to provide their own transportation.0 9
Federal District Judge J. Braxton Craven approved the plan in
1965, finding that the board had no duty to "increase the mixing
of the races" in the school population." °
Green changed the legal landscape, and the NAACP's lawyers
reopened the case in 1968. Although more desegregation had
occurred by then, over two-thirds of the system's African-Ameri-
can students attended all-black schools. Relying on the interpre-
tation of Green that imposed an affirmative obligation on school
boards to eliminate segregation "root and branch," District
Judge James McMillan concluded that Green required-or, as it
turned out, at least allowed him to require-more substantial
steps. In 1970 he adopted a proposal initially designed by one of
the plaintiffs' experts. The plan involved pairing African-Ameri-
can and white schools, creating attendance zones extending from
the city outward to the suburbs and the county, and-as a re-
sult-instituting substantial student busing. The aim, Judge
McMillan wrote, was to achieve ratios of whites to African-
Americans in each school that roughly approximated the ratio in
the entire district.'
108. SCHWAR'rz, supra note 18, at 91.
109. Id. at 9, 11.
110. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 243 F. Supp. 667, 670
(W.D.N.C. 1965).
111. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklinburg Bd. of Educ., 318 F. Supp. 786, 792
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The court of appeals affirmed the portions of Judge
McMillan's order dealing with junior high and high schools, but
it vacated the portions dealing with elementary schools.' Ac-
cording to the court of appeals, the Constitution required district
judges to enforce "reasonable way[s] of eliminating all segrega-
tion,""3 but requiring as much busing as Judge McMillan's or-
der required in elementary schools was not reasonable."'
The Justices voted unanimously to hear the plaintiffs' chal-
lenge to the reversal of the elementary school order, and they
stayed the effect of the court of appeals decision. Judge
McMillan's order would be implemented while the Court consid-
ered Swann. The case attracted substantial public attention, and
the Court put it on a somewhat accelerated schedule, hearing
argument on the Court's first day of oral argument during the
1970 Term." 5
Bernard Schwartz has provided an extremely detailed account
of the maneuvering inside the Court,"6 and I confine my pre-
sentation to some highlights. As in Alexander, the impetus to
question Green's meaning, and therefore the meaning of desegre-
gation, came from the Chief Justice and Justice Black, while the
impetus to evade the answer came from Justices Brennan and
Stewart.
As he had in Alexander, Burger evoked the Court's traditions,
this time suggesting that because the case was as important as
Brown, the Justices should simply discuss it without taking a
vote. He was bothered by what seemed to him the "rigidity" of
Judge McMillan's use of racial ratios. Justice Black reiterated
his view that "[it's foolish to think this question will be solved
in our own or our children's lifetime.""7 As he consistently had
done, Black was resigned to a rule of purely formal nondiscrimi-
nation: "there was to be no legal discrimination on account of
(W.D.N.C. 1970).
112. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 138, 147 (4th Cir.
1970).
113. Id. at 145.
114. Id.
115. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 92-94.
116. See id. at 100-84.
117. Id. at 101.
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race by any government."'18 A neighborhood school policy did
not violate that principle.
To varying degrees, all the other Justices disagreed with these
points. As they stated their positions, a consensus apparently
emerged. Rigid racial ratios were not required and probably
were impermissible. Some one-race schools might remain even
in fully desegregated districts. Otherwise, though, district judges
had a great deal of discretion in determining what was needed
to eliminate segregation. The proper question was whether
Judge McMillan's order was within the broad range of discretion
that he possessed. They all agreed that it was. There were some
differences on the margin: Justice Harlan and recently ap-
pointed Justice Harry Blackmun would have preferred an opin-
ion providing some detailed guidance about the proper exercise
of discretion; Justice Brennan argued for the interpretation of
Green requiring substantial integration. Overall, though, the
tenor of the discussion was that Judge McMillan had not erred,
and that the court of appeals should not have modified his order.
Again Burger's peculiar view of his role impeded the develop-
ment of an. opinion. Although his statements to his colleagues
strongly suggested that he disagreed with Judge McMillan, he
believed that the Chief Justice should speak for the Court in
such an important case. He therefore drafted a "memorandum"
to serve as the starting point for a Court opinion. He counseled
his colleagues to defer writing separately "until we have ex-
hausted all other efforts to reach a common view."119 In
"emphasiz[ing] the importance of our attempting to reach an
accommodation," 2 ' and making his draft the starting point,
Burger gained some strategic leverage. His colleagues would
have to move toward him by suggesting modifications to his
draft. Once again, it was easy for his colleagues to suspect
Burger's motives, and, once again, his motives were almost cer-
tainly not Machiavellian. Rather, he was trying in his fumbling
way to play the role he believed a Chief Justice should play.
Burger's draft ended up remanding the case to Judge
118. Id.
119. Id. at 113.
120. Id.
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McMillan, but it was hardly an endorsement of what McMillan
had done. For example, Burger narrowly construed Green, writ-
ing that "some of the problems we now face arise from viewing
Brown I as imposing a requirement for racial balance, i.e., inte-
gration, rather than a prohibition against segregation."12' Al-
though hardly inaccurate, this statement was a red flag to those
who recalled that Judge John Parker's similar statements had
fueled southern resistance to Brown itself."2 Prodded by argu-
ments that lower courts could consider the policies pursued by
government agencies other than school boards--citing decisions
by public housing authorities, for example-in deciding whether
the "prohibition against segregation" had been violated, Burger
confined his focus to school boards."m He would not use deseg-
regation as a tool for larger schemes of social engineering: "The
elimination of racial discrimination in public schools is a large
enough burden... . Too much baggage can break down any
vehicle."24
Burger then deferred to the trial judge's discretion to order a
remedy. Here, too, the tone was grudging: "Populations, pupils
or misplaced schools cannot be moved as simply as earth by a
bulldozer, or property by corporations."" 5 Judge McMillan's or-
der, the draft opinion said, had "strong intimations" that he
insisted on "fixed mathematical racial balance."26 Although
racial composition might be "one relevant step," it could not be a
rigid requirement. Nor could a district judge insist that all one-
race schools be eliminated. District judges could change atten-
dance zones and order busing, but they had to be cautious.
These were "not impermissible tool[s]." 12' The aim was to
"achieve as nearly as possible that distribution of students and
those patterns of assignments that would normally have existed
121. Id. at 114.
122. TUSHNET, supra note 19, at 241; Letter from Justice Brennan to Chief Justice
Burger (Mar. 8, 1971), Marshall Papers, box 71, file 6, at 5 (Judge Parker's state-
ment "raised so much trouble for so long a time").
123. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 114.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 115.
127. Id. at 115-16.
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had the school authorities not previously practiced discrimina-
tion.""12 Exactly how that might be determined was obscure,
but "reasonable" determinations by district judges would suffice.
On busing, the draft emphasized that "the age of the stu-
dents"129 was an important consideration in deciding how much
travel time should be required. This emphasis seemed to suggest
that the court of appeals was correct in reversing the busing
order for elementary students while affirming the order for stu-
dents in upper schools, but the draft nonetheless remanded the
case to Judge McMillan.
The other Justices on the Court disagreed with the tenor of
Burger's draft. Justice Harlan had already sent him a draft
opinion stating that "racially identifiable school[s]" were incon-
sistent with Brown I." District judges could use "a remedial
criterion based on results"1"' to determine whether segregation
had been eliminated, and Justice Harlan would explicitly have
endorsed "mathematical racial balancing."32 Justice Douglas
responded to the Chief Justice's draft by insisting that it misin-
terpreted Judge McMillan's order by erroneously understanding
it to require "racial balance." Further, Justice Douglas would not
ignore discriminatory actions by other government agencies in
dealing with segregated schools. Justice Marshall sent Burger a
draft opinion saying explicitly at every point that Judge
McMillan had not abused his discretion. "3
Justice Brennan took a stern tone. Burger's draft was, in plac-
es, "wrong." It had a negative tone when what was needed was a
positive opinion. Brennan pushed for "specific[]" and "positive
guidelines."34 As he had said in conference, the goal was "to
achieve substantial integration."135 In seeking that goal, dis-
trict courts could "take race into account in assigning pupils,"
they could use racial ratios as "a goal or rule of thumb," they
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 107.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 118-20.
134. Id. at 121.
135. Id.
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could use all of the techniques Judge McMillan had used, and
they should regard busing as "only an incident of the remedial
techniques... not [to] be viewed as a separate issue.
"136
Justice Stewart expressed "serious reservations" about some
parts of Burger's draft, in particular that the draft suggested
that a school board might not be allowed to seek racial balance
in its schools. 3 ' However, like Burger, he would not have used
a school desegregation case to address the effects of housing dis-
crimination. He was less certain thafn Justices Douglas and
Brennan that Judge McMillan had used racial ratios merely as a
starting point or rule of thumb. He thought that Judge
McMillan might erroneously have believed that it was impermis-
sible to have racially identifiable schools, even those resulting
from housing patterns. As Stewart saw it, these were modest
qualifications to his overall position that Judge McMillan had
been largely correct and Burger's draft too grudging in acknowl-
edging the district judge's remedial powers. The qualifications,
though, helped stiffen Burger's resistance on these points as he
yielded on others.'38
Stewart sent Burger his own draft opinion. Although Stewart
would not have recognized "a substantive constitutional right to
attend a school having any particular racial mixture," once a
substantive constitutional violation had been established-as it
had been here-the only question was whether the district
judge's remedial order was within his discretion.'39 Stewart
then shifted his focus and addressed the claim that Brown and
Green required no more than that school boards ignore race in
making student assignments. That claim supported pure neigh-
borhood zoning. However, Justice Stewart wrote, "[v]iewed as a
remedy for decades of self-imposed segregation, colorblind neigh-
borhood zoning... is closely analogous to the 'freedom of choice'
plans" in Green." ' Where neighborhood zoning would repro-
duce the prior pattern of racial separation, it was "not enough to
136. Id. at 122.
137. Id. at 124; see also Letter from Justice Stewart to Chief Justice Burger (Dec.
14, 1970), Marshall Papers, box 71, file 6.
138. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 127-29, 131-36.
139. Id. at 125.
140. Id. at 126.
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meet the affirmative remedial duty of the local board."' After
examining a list of possible remedies-most of which Judge
McMillan had used-Justice Stewart described them as "an
appropriate part of... the district judge's inventory of means to
the end of disestablishing the dual system."
Chief Justice Burger misunderstood the messages that he was
receiving. As he stated in the cover memorandum he circulated
with a revised draft, he knew that "some points [his colleagues
had made] were in conflict with [his] own position."43 Appar-
ently, he believed that he could solidify what seemed to him sup-
port for his position by stating it even more clearly, and thereby
weaken the position of those who disagreed with him. That be-
lief misinterpreted the comments he had received. Any sensitive
reader would have understood that the Justices Burger might
have counted on-Harlan and Stewart in particular-were po-
litely but firmly disagreeing with him. The politeness was the
form, the disagreements the substance. Burger apparently be-
lieved that the disagreements were marginal and that the polite-
ness indicated fundamental agreement on his central points.'"
Burger's second draft did little to accommodate his critics. He
did adopt Stewart's point that school boards could assign stu-
dents to schools in appropriate ratios "to prepare students to live
in a pluralistic society,"45 but, he wrote, federal courts had "no
such roving, at-large powers." "6 Responding to suggestions
from Justices Stewart and Brennan, Burger endorsed the use of
plans that allowed any student to transfer from a school in
which he or she was a member of the majority to one where he
141. Id.
142. Id. at 127.
143. Id. at 131.
144. See id. at 131-36.
145. Id. at 133.
146. Id. This qualification probably can be best understood as the result of the
Chief Justice's style of drafting opinions. Typically his law clerks wrote first drafts.
He then would insist upon inserting particular lines that captivated him, even if
they did not fit terribly well with the remainder of the opinion. Ordinarily these
insertions were relatively unthinking, almost spontaneous, reactions to the drafts,
and they would pop into and drop out of opinions without much significance. For a
related comment from another Justice on Burger's drafting approach, see Letter from
Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger (Mar. 10, 1979), Marshall Papers, box 223,
file 12.
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or she would be in the minority. Instead of saying that altering
attendance zones was "not an impermissible tool," the new draft
called it "a permissible tool."47 Finally, the opinion would have
made a general statement approving busing in appropriate cas-
es. Borrowing a sentence from Justice Stewart, Burger wrote,
"[d]esegregation plans cannot be limited to the walk-in
school."'
148
Otherwise, the second draft was even more critical of Judge
McMillan's order than the first. Early in the draft, it reiterated
the statement distinguishing integration from prohibiting segre-
gation and then strengthened it by stating that "the term inte-
gration nowhere appears in any opinion dealing with pupil seg-
regation."149 Burger added new language emphasizing the lim-
its of judicial action under the Constitution:
In policy and program the authority of the political
branch-Congress, the states and school authorities-is
broader than that of the courts .... Much that a majority or
even all of this Court might consider desirable and proper
lies beyond our power to command and we serve [the] Consti-
tution best if that is our guide.1"
The opinion continued to assert that desegregation decrees were
different from traditional judicial orders.1 '
Burger may have hoped that this draft would gain votes from
Justices Black, Stewart, Blackmun, and perhaps Harlan. Jus-
tices Brennan and Douglas, however, met with Justice Stewart
and persuaded him that Burger's approach was inadequate.
Judge McMillan had not used rigid mathematical ratios; rather,
he used them flexibly, as Stewart believed they could be used.
Interpreting Judge McMillan's order to avoid "doctrinaire" ad-
herence to "a rule of 'racial balance,"' Justice Stewart decided
that he should vote to approve the order without qualifica-
147. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 135.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 131. Justice Black's opinion in Montgomery County did use this term,
but that case was a teacher desegregation case. See United States v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
150. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 132.
151: Id.
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tion.'52 The memorandum that Stewart had sent to Burger two
months earlier was recast as a draft dissent. This opinion never
surfaced-apparently only Justices Douglas and Brennan re-
ceived copies-and it need not be examined in detail. It mat-
tered a great deal, though, because without Stewart's agreement
it would seem impossible to convert Burger's draft into an opin-
ion for the Court.'5'
According to Schwartz, Burger had learned that Stewart was
likely to abandon him. The Chief Justice went to Stewart's
chambers and said that he, too, had decided to affirm Judge
McMillan fully. According to a clerk, Burger's position left Jus-
tice Stewart "completely boxed in": if Burger circulated a draft
affirming Judge McMillan, Stewart would have to go along."
This statement may overdramatize the situation. When Burger
met Stewart, he already knew that Justice Harlan would not
join his draft. Harlan had written the Chief Justice that "the
district court handled the matter correctly and ... its judgment
should be affirmed. . . ." He also criticized Burger's "reasonable-
ness" standard. 1
5
Burger's next attempt abandoned the contrast between deseg-
regation cases and other traditional equity cases. The little es-
say on the courts' role disappeared as easily as it had appeared.
The "Parker-like" statement contrasting integration and desegre-
gation disappeared from its place early in the opinion, only to
reappear later in Burger's discussion of mathematical ratios.
There, Burger wrote that ratios may be "arn appropriate starting
point in shaping a remedy.""6 A starting point only, though,
because "[tihe Constitution, of course, does not command inte-
gration; it forbids segregation." 5 ' No particular racial balance
had to be maintained permanently. Busing, the new draft explic-
itly stated, was "within [the district] court's power to provide
equitable relief."'58 The conclusion continued to use the term
152. Id. at 139, 141-42.
153. Id. at 139-44.
154. Id. at 144.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 146.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 147.
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"reasonable," but now it explicitly said that "we are unable to
conclude that the order of the District Court is not reasonable,
feasible and workable."' 59
The bottom line was at last where a clear majority believed
that it should be. The question that remained for the rest of the
Justices, then, was whether they should worry about the
opinion's tone or sign on because the result was a rather clear
affirmation of the power of district courts to order extensive
remedies in segregation cases and a somewhat grudging affir-
mance of the use of that power in Swann. If, as many people
believed, Swann presented a case at the extreme end of the
spectrum of desegregation cases, finding that Judge McMillan's
order was not an abuse of his discretion would indicate that
similar orders in less extreme cases were even more clearly ap-
propriate. Of course, no one on the Court had seriously contend-
ed that district judges had to enter orders like McMillan's, a
position that is about all that Burger's draft really disap-
proved. 6 '
With the discussions at this point, those who wanted a stron-
ger position nibbled at Burger's opinion. Justice Douglas wanted
Burger to remove the passage saying that courts in school deseg-
regation cases should not concern themselves with discrimina-
tory actions by other public agencies, even if those actions affect-
ed "disproportionate racial concentrations in some schools." 6'
Justice Marshall wanted Burger to remove the related line that
one vehicle could carry only so much baggage.'62 Justice
Brennan continued to push for more extensive revisions, which
would eliminate the "hazard" that a grudging tone might "arrest
the trend" in the South toward acquiescence in Brown.'
Burger's draft, according to Brennan, "express[es] a sympathy
for these local boards that [he did not] think is warranted....
[Any tone of sympathy with local boards having to grapple with
problems of their own making can only encourage continued in-
159. Id. at 148.
160. See id. at 148-49.
161. Id. at 149.
162. Letter from Justice Marshall to Chief Justice Burger (Mar. 23, 1971), Marshall
Papers, box 711, file 6.
163. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 151.
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trans [iigence. " "' Brennan was particularly bothered by
Burger's statement contrasting desegregation and integration:
"To revive [that contrast] again would I think only rekindle vain
hopes."165 These issues were, as Brennan acknowledged, mat-
ters of "tone .... But as our experience with 'all deliberate
speed' proved, tone is of primary importance." 6  Justice
Harlan also objected to matters of detail. He thought that a test
seeking to determine the distribution of students that would
have existed if segregation had never occured "cannot offer any
real guidance."'67
Not surprisingly, Burger was more responsive to Harlan's
suggestions than to Brennan's. For example, he deleted a phrase
describing some of the considerations regarding student assign-
ment policies as "in part a limitation on the extent of bus trans-
portation of students," that Harlan thought might suggest "a
presumption against 'bussing' as such."6 ' Harlan offered a re-
vised section of the opinion dealing with racial balance. In the
course of reorganizing Burger's draft, Harlan dropped the state-
ment about desegregation and integration to which Brennan
objected.169
At this point, most of the controversy within the Court had
ended. Chief Justice Burger still lacked formal agreement on his
opinion, but his third draft made it difficult to organize an alter-
native opinion. By the third draft, much of the grudging tone
had been eliminated. Two additional redrafts made largely sty-
listic changes. v° The redrafts brought parts of the opinion that
had been untouched earlier into rhetorical agreement with the
remainder, further solidifying approval of the district court or-
der. For example, the opinion no longer referred to the irrele-
vance of action by other government agencies; instead it referred
to "all the problems of racial prejudice,"' which might refer to
164. Id.
165. Id. at 152.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 153.
168. Id. at 162.
169. Id. at 157-62.
170. Id. at 157-71, 179-84.
171. Id. at 181.
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purely private prejudice beyond the reach of the Constitution.
Nonetheless, the "one vehicle" sentence remained in the final
draft. 72 With the votes in hand, the Chief Justice refused to
delete the suggestion that busing elementary school children
was more troublesome than busing older children. As he told
Brennan, some of the continuing objections were "just the differ-
ence between the way in which two people express the same
ideas but others seem to go beyond what at least five are pre-
pared to accept."'73 Burger's memorandum with his sixth and
final draft had a beleaguered tone: "I believe I have demon-
strated a flexible attitude, even down to using words of others
when I saw no real difference and preferred my own."7 4 He did
not "prefer all of these changes," but wanted a unanimous opin-
ion. 75
In the end, everyone was tired of the process of negotiating an
opinion acceptable to all. Neither the written documents nor
Schwartz's account, however, support the conclusion that the
Court fought an internal battle over Swann. Burger began with
a fuzzy set of ideas about busing, which overlapped to some
extent with the views of some of his colleagues, but which, to the
extent that they had any substance, were rather different from
those of the majority. The fuzziness of his thinking led Burger to
believe that he could write an opinion for the Court. Then, as
his drafts set down the ideas in necessarily more precise terms,
Burger .discovered the differences between his views and the
majority's. Once again, though, the fuzziness helped. As Burger
modified his opinion, he could tell himself that he was simply
substituting other Justices' words for his own while retaining
the same underlying ideas. Most of his colleagues would have
been surprised at this characterization of the process. However,
precisely because Burger never thought that he was really
172. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 22.
173. Justice Black circulated a proposed dissent, which sharply criticized busing
and endorsed neighborhood schools. SCHWvARTZ, supra note 18, at 178-79. Schwartz
plausibly interprets this dissent as "a bargaining ploy," designed to keep Burger
from modifying his opinion even further in the direction Brennan continued to press.
Id. at 179.
174. Id. at 180.
175. Id. at 182.
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changing his position-and perhaps he was not, because he
never really had a position to begin with-the division within
the Court never became heated.
E. Divisions Consolidated
After Justices Black and Harlan were replaced by Justices
Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, the Court permanently
divided on the issue of remedies for past segregation. The new
Justices shared Burger's unease with extensive judicial involve-
ment in desegregation. In addition, Powell could bring his ex-
perience as chair of the Richmond School Board from 1952 to
1961-the perspective of the white South in the early years after
Brown-to counter Marshall's experience in attempting to bring
about desegregation-the perspective of the African-American
South.'76 The most striking feature of the Court's internal de-
liberations, though, is how uncontentious they were. The justices
expressed their views, voted, drafted opinions, and joined one or
another side-and that, basically, was that.
As a sign of the rift, the Court's tradition of unanimity in
desegregation cases disappeared in Wright v. Council of Empo-
ria.'77 The case involved a consolidated city-county district that
was two-thirds African-American. Invoking Virginia's school
consolidation statutes in 1969, the city sought to separate from
the county system. That separation would have increased the
African-American percentage in the county system to seventy
two percent, while creating a city district that was roughly even-
ly divided racially.178 The majority held that the separation of
the city and county schools would unconstitutionally interfere
with desegregation.179 The four Justices appointed by President
Richard Nixon dissented.' The case made so few ripples with-
in the Court, though, that even Woodward and Armstrong do not
mention it.
The Denver school case was the Court's first extended con-
176. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 47, at 161.
177. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
178. Id. at 464.
179. Id. at 466-67.
180. Id. at 471.
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frontation with northern segregation.'' Justice Powell used
the case to offer the proposal that the Court should simulta-
neously condemn de facto segregation while sharply curtailing
the remedies they could order; he would have extended the
courts' reach into the urban North, while making their regula-
tion of school boards much less intrusive. Once again, although
there was uncertainty about what Justice Blackmun would do,
he eventually joined Justice Brennan's opinion, which treated
the Denver case as involving de jure segregation and developed
an elaborate scheme of shifting burdens of proof to deal with
Northern segregation."8 2
Probably the most revealing interactions occurred in a case
that made no law at all. In 1972, District Judge Robert Merhige
directed that Richmond, Virginia, and its suburbs jointly partic-
ipate in a desegregation plan that would have involved trans-
porting students across established district lines." Merhige
believed that this plan was a natural extension of Swann: If
neighborhoods were not sacrosanct in the effort to eliminate the
vestiges of segregation, why should school district boundaries
be?' The court of appeals, however, reversed Judge Merhige,
and the Supreme Court decided to review the case.
Because of his service on the Richmond School Board, Justice
Powell could not sit in the case. When the Justices discussed the
case, they were evenly divided. The case arose as the Justices
were reviewing the Denver segregation case as well. In that
case, Justice Stewart had agreed with Justice Brennan's posi-
tion, but now Justice Stewart finally "got off the bus," as he put
it. Justice Blackmun considered Justice Powell's proposal in the
Denver case but eventually decided that Justice Brennan's ap-
proach resolved the particular problem without getting into the
broader issues associated with de facto segregation. In the Rich-
mond case, though, Justice Blackmun thought that Judge
Merhige had gone too far."5
181. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
182. Id. at 190-214; WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 47, at 262-65, 268.
183. Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th
Cir. 1972), affid, 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
184. See Bradley, 338 F. Supp. at 79-80.
185. WOODWARD & ARMiSTRONG, supra note 47, at 266-67.
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The Court heard the Richmond case on Monday, April 23,
1973.1"' Ordinarily the Court would have announced its even
division quite soon after argument, perhaps as early as April 30.
However, in this case, the Justices delayed the announcement
because, at the Court's conference, Justice White outlined an ap-
proach that "intrigue[d]" Justice Blackmun, and he wanted to
see whether White could come up with a persuasive elaboration
of the approach.'87 White suggested remanding the case to
Judge Merhige, and quickly drafted a proposed opinion." This
opinion had three elements. First, it relied heavily on the princi-
ple approved in Swann that district judges had extremely broad
discretion in devising appropriate remedies for prior segregation.
Second, it would have found that transportation across existing
district lines could be an appropriate remedy. All the Justices
agreed that cross-district remedies might be appropriate if the
city and its suburbs "colluded" in some formal way to maintain
segregation (for example, by agreeing that a suburb could annex
a part of the city, thereby removing from the city a white resi-
dential area that might be part of a city desegregation order).
But, White suggested, such remedies might also be ordered even
if no formal collusion occurred. Third, the opinion would have
held that Judge Merhige erred because he sought to achieve ra-
cial balance through his cross-district remedy.189
The strategy behind this draft was clear. Justice Blackmun
insisted on reversing the particular order Judge Merhige had
entered, but perhaps he could be persuaded to approve cross-
district remedies in principle. Justice Rehnquist criticized
White's approach as relaxing the "collusion" requirement too
much,'" and the Chief Justice wrote that Judge Merhige had
"embarked on an 'end run' around Swann," seeking to achieve
racial balance in the Richmond and suburban schools. 9 ' That
186. Bradley, 412 U.S. at 92.
187. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Chief.Justice Burger (Apr. 25, 1973), Mar-
shall Papers, box 112, file 3.
188. Justice White, Draft Memorandum Opinion (Bradley v. School Bd.) (Apr. 30,
1973), Marshall Papers, box 112, file 3.
189. Id. at 7.
190. Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Conference (May 3, 1973), Marshall Papers,
box 113, file 3.
191. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to Conference (May 10, 1973),
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was apparently enough to keep Blackmun from joining White.
The announcement that the Court was evenly divided was made
on May 21, 1973, a month after oral argument.
19 2
The Richmond case highlights how the Burger Court dealt
with segregation cases: The liberals on the Court made modest
efforts to carry their program along, but those efforts failed and
no one thought much about them. In some ways, this merely
reflected the state of collegial interaction in the late 1970s and
into the 1980s. By that time, relatively few true exchanges about
cases and proposed opinions occurred. A Justice would circulate
a draft, and the notes joining the opinion would roll in. Occa-
sionally a Justice would suggest modest changes in wording, but
these changes rarely were significant.
Two cases near the end of the 1970s illustrate this state of
affairs. In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,'93 a firm
majority voted'to vacate a court of appeals decision directing the
district judge to order more extensive transportation remedies in
a northern state case. When Justice Rehnquist circulated his
draft, Justice Brennan wrote that he was "disturbed by the tone
of [Rehnquist's] opinion," which he found "unnecessarily
harsh."'94 Somewhat disingenuously, Brennan said that he
would "rather not" write separately, and "probably won't if you
can see your way to remove the chastising tone."'95 Rehnquist
was not inclined to do so, however, and he politely replied that
he would "certainly give" specific suggestions "careful consider-
ation." 96 Brennan responded with "suggestions for softening
the vigor of the criticism" of the court of appeals, but, he wrote,
he would "certainly understand why you may conclude that I'm
asking too much."'97 Justice John Paul Stevens supported Jus-
Marshall Papers, box 112, file 3.
192. When the Court revisited the issue in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974), Justice Powell participated in a majority that barred interdistrict remedies.
Justice Marshall wrote a long, impassioned dissent. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 781-815
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
194. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Rehnquist (June 1, 1977), Marshall
Papers, box 193, file 1.
195. Id.
196. Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Brennan (June 2, 1977), Marshall
Papers, box 193, file 1.
197. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Rehnquist (June 3, 1977), Marshall
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tice Brennan.' 5
In the end, Rehnquist kept some quite strong criticisms in his
opinion; eliminating them, he told his colleagues, would "some-
what alter[ the focus of the opinion." 9 The published opinion
called one district court conclusion "of questionable validity,"
and said that the district court's remedy "was certainly not
based on an unduly cautious understanding of its authority"; the
court of appeals "simply had no warrant in our cases for impos-
ing" a system-wide remedy where only three particular viola-
tions were found, and "imposed a remedy.., entirely out of pro-
portion to the constitutional violations," because it was "vaguely
dissatisfied with the limited character" of the district court's
remedy."'
After all, why should Justice Rehnquist have done much? Jus-
tice Stevens concurred, and Justice Brennan concurred in the
result. Their separate opinions attempted to map out the find-
ings the lower courts should make to justify the system-wide
remedy.2"' Their opinions were functional dissents strategically
cast as concurrences. Justice Rehnquist apparently understood
that the tone of his opinion had to be stern in order to send a
message that might in the end be more important than the pre-
cise holding.
Two years earlier, Justice Stevens had tried a similar maneu-
ver to recast an outcome with which he was in basic
disagreement. Justice Powell wanted to use a Dallas desegrega-
tion case to "rethink[] ... the role of the federal judiciary in
public education."" 2 A district court had ordered the city to
adopt a desegregation plan that involved substantial student
Papers, box 193, file 1.
198. Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Rehnquist (June 3, 1977), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 193, file 1.
199. Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Conference (June 6, 1977), Marshall
Papers, box 193, file 1.
200. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 433 U.S. at 413, 415, 417-18.
201. See id. at 421-26. For the opinion after remand, upholding the system-wide
remedy on the basis of the findings Justices Stevens and Brennan requested, see
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 529 (1979).
202. Justice Powell, Proposed Dissent from Denial of Certiorari (Estes v. Metropoli-
tan Branches of the Dallas NAACP) (Jan. 11, 1979), Marshall Papers, box 245, file
7, at 12.
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transportation, although it tried to preserve some aspects of
geographical zoning."3 The court of appeals sent the case back
to the district court for a determination of whether it could re-
duce the "large number of one-race schools" that remained.2 4
At first there were not enough votes to hear the city's appeal,
but Justice Powell's proposed dissent from denial of review per-
suaded the Court to hear the case. Powell believed that the
orders lower federal courts were entering contributed to
"resegregation" as whites fled city school systems undergoing
desegregation." 5
As in a number of desegregation cases, Marshall recused him-
self from the case because the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People or its branches, former clients,
were named plaintiffs."' After argument, the Justices were
evenly divided. The usual consequence of an even division is an
order affirming the lower court. To avoid even the modest impli-
cation that four Justices believed the court of appeals correct,
however, Chief Justice Burger proposed to dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted. That disposition made sense because the
court of appeals had not actually directed the elimination of one-
race schools, and it was premature to assume that the district
court would actually do so.
To head off Justice Powell, Stevens asked whether it was "ap-
propriate to invest a substantial amount of work in the prepara-
tion of opinions" when the Court was evenly divided.2 7 Again,
203. Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1192, 1196, 1203-07 (N.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd, 572
F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub. nom, Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of
the NAACP, 440 U.S. 906 (1979), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 437 (1980).
204. Tasby, 572 F.2d at 1014.
205. Justice Powell, Proposed Dissent From Denial of Certiorari (Estes v. Metropoli-
tan Branches of the Dallas NAACP) (Jan. 11, 1979), Marshall Papers, box 245, file
7.
206. In 1984 Marshall changed his position. He told his colleagues that he no lon-
ger thought it necessary to disqualify himself in all cases where the NAACP was a
party. He had severed his ties with the NAACP decades earlier and was "uninvolved
in [its] internal working." As with the relations between a judge and his or her
former law firm, "[tlime therefore ha[d] erased the ties" he previously had with the
NAACP. Letter from Justice Marshall to Conference (Oct. 4, 1984), Marshall Papers,
box 353, file 9, at 2.
207. Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Conference (Oct. 31, 1979), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 245, file 7.
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this tactic fooled no one. Even Chief Justice Burger knew what
was happening, and he jokingly changed his vote to affirm a
court of appeals decision that was wildly inconsistent with the
positions he had taken through the 1970s. That way, Burger
said, there would be no problem with Powell writing a dis-
sent."' In the end, the Court dismissed the writ as improvi-
dently granted,2 9 and Powell published a long opinion stating
his views, which Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined.210
F. Coda
The Court has not yet definitively resolved a question that
arose in Swann and, even more, in later northern segregation
cases: To what extent may courts in school segregation cases
rely on residential segregation to justify awarding relief? The
question has at least two parts. Some residential segregation
resulted from governmental actions such as locating segregated
public housing projects in white and African-American neighbor-
hoods, thereby perpetuating their racial identifiability.21' Sec-
ond, some residential segregation resulted from segregated edu-
cation itself, as parents selected where to live based on what
type of schools were nearby. 12 In the latter case, the law could
treat residential segregation itself as a vestige of school segrega-
tion. Continued patterns of racial separation in the schools
might be the result of residential segregation that was caused by
prior school segregation. If school boards have an affirmative
duty to eliminate the vestiges of school segregation, they might
have to respond to the effects that residential segregation had
on schools.
208. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to Conference (Nov. 2, 1979), Mar-
shall Papers, box 245, file 7 ("Since [Justice Powell] has a strong desire to write his
views, I will change my vote to affirm, making 5-3 to affirm (as of now!).").
209. Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980).
210. Id. at 438.
211. See, e.g., Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurispru-
dence of Denial and Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1331-32 (1991) ("A determina-
tion that residential segregation is unconnected to state action . . . conflicts with the
realities of history.").
212. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973) (noting that location
of schools may influence patterns of residential development and composition of in-
ner city neighborhoods).
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That issue lurked in a case decided during Justice Marshall's
final term on the Court. The Court's main concern in Board of
Education v. Dowell213 was the standard for determining when
a district court could end its supervision of a school desegrega-
tion case.214 The court of appeals had applied a stringent stan-
dard, allowing termination of the decree only if continuing it
would be a "grievous wrong." 5 After the conference discussion
of the case, it was clear that a majority of the Justices wanted to
reverse the court of appeals." 6 Beyond that, however, things
were less clear. Some wanted to signal that it should be relative-
ly easy for district courts to terminate decrees;" 7 others want-
ed to specify a clear standard for termination;21 still others
thought that situations varied so much that it would be unwise
to provide much specific guidance to lower courts.1 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist drafted an opinion that, he said, "de-
cides only one of the principal questions," holding that the court
of appeals' standard was too stringent and remanding the case
for further consideration.2 The draft included a footnote refer-
ring to residential segregation's effects on school segregation,
but the footnote simply directed the lower courts to consider that
question anew on remand. 1 Justice White urged Rehnquist
"to say expressly that on remand, residential segregation should
not be treated as a vestige of the prior illegally segregated school
system."222 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor immediately protest-
213. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
214. Id. at 240.
215. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)), rev'd sub nom., Board of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
216. Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Conference (Nov. 16, 1990), Marshall
Papers, box 529, file 4.
217. See id.
218. Letter from Justice White to Chief Justice Rehnquist (Dec. 4, 1990), Marshall
Papers, box 529, file 4.
219. Letter from Justice O'Connor to Chief Justice Rehnquist (Dec. 4, 1990), Mar-
shall Papers, box 529, file 4.
220. See Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Conference, supra note 216.
221. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Draft Opinion (Board of Educ. v. Dowell) (Nov. 16,
1990), Marshall Papers, box 529, file 4, at 11 n.2.
222. Letter from Justice White to Chief Justice Rehnquist (Dec. 4, 1990), Marshall
Papers, box 529, file 4.
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ed: "I cannot go along with anything that even remotely suggests
the resolution" of the residential segregation issue.223 As she
saw it, even Rehnquist's footnote "sends unwarranted signals"
on the question, but "[u]nfortunately we do not appear to have a
Court for any particular solution."2 Rehnquist spoke with
O'Connor and then told White that he planned to leave the foot-
note as it was, "not saying anything more about it." 2"
Justice O'Connor's militance in this exchange is striking. As
Rehnquist pointed out, she was one of the five Justices who had
voted to reverse the court of appeals over three dissents.2 She
seems to have been concerned that resolving the residential seg-
regation question would have taken the Court too far down the
road too quickly. In contrast, a more gradual movement, in a
succession of cases, might be more acceptable.227
The contrast between large and gradual changes in the law
may best explain the absence of contention over desegregation
cases in the 1970s and 1980s. As long as the Court moved slow-
ly, even though from the liberals' point of view it was in the
wrong direction, raising the stakes within the Court would have
been unproductive. The votes to change the law were there, and
as the failed effort to shift Justice Blackmun's vote in the Rich-
mond case demonstrates, the votes were unlikely to disappear.
Under those circumstances, the Court's liberals could do no more
than keep the pace of change moderate. Converting division into
contention would not have helped.
III. THE ERA OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. The Court's Analytic Problems with Affirmative Action
The question of affirmative action emerged almost naturally
223. Letter from Justice O'Connor to Chief Justice Rehnquist (Dec. 4, 1990), Mar-
shall Papers, box 529, file 4.
224. Id.
225. Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Justice White (Dec. 13, 1990), Marshall
Papers, box 529, file 4.
226. Id. Justice Souter did not participate in the decision because the case had
been argued a week before he took his seat on the Court.
227. It is hard to avoid the suggestion that Justice O'Connor's position here reso-
nates with the tone of the celebrated joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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from the Court's confrontation with desegregation remedies. In
Swann, Justice Stewart's first response to Chief Justice Warren
Burger's initial draft opposing busing was to express dismay
that the draft "purport[s] not to decide the constitutionality of 'a
school authority decision that as a matter of sound educational
policy schools should be racially balanced. . . .' I think it is im-
portant to state that such a school board decision would be whol-
ly constitutional."228  The Court's final opinion adopted
Stewart's position, saying that "[s]chool authorities.., might
well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to
live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed
ratio of Negro to white students ... .2
In the terms used in current law, this statement implied that
public agencies could make race-conscious decisions, because
otherwise, a school board could not ensure that the prescribed
ratio would be met at each school. There is an-instructive con-
trast here with the Court's rejection of the proposition that the
Constitution mandates only desegregation, not integration. To
its proponents, that proposition meant that governments could
not take race into account in their decisions in any way. Brown
gained its force, in their view, from the moral proposition that
race was totally irrelevant to any decisions governments make.
When it rejected that view, however, the Court did not mean
that the Constitution required integration. At the start of the
Court's confrontation with modern segregation problems, advo-
cates offered the Court two positions: either the Constitution re-
quired only desegregation or it required integration. Swann
demonstrated that there was an intermediate position: the Con-
stitution might bar race-conscious decisions that disadvantage
African-Americans, and it might not require governments to
make such decisions to overcome prior discrimination, but it
certainly allowed them to do so."
The Court's ready acceptance of affirmative action in Swann
rapidly disappeared, perhaps in part because the school context
228. SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 124.
229. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
230. Id. at 18 ("To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretion-
ary powers of school authorities . . ").
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misled some Justices about the costs of affirmative action. When
affirmative action issues arose in contexts where the resources
to be distributed were obviously limited-in higher education
and employment-these Justices began to worry that affirmative
action programs unfairly distributed those resources on a racial
basis.' Similar distributional questions lurked in elementary
and secondary school cases, but somehow the allocation of chil-
dren to schools did not seem quite the same, perhaps because no
matter where the children were sent, each ended up in a school
operated by the school board. Affirmative action programs in
higher education excluded some whites from a university, forc-
ing them to abandon their aspirations or at least seek education
elsewhere, while affirmative action programs in employment
meant that some whites had less access to more attractive jobs.
Whether or not these distinctions made analytic sense, they
seem to have affected those Justices who became increasingly
troubled by affirmative action programs.
Agreement about affirmative action disappeared for another
reason. Everyone on the Court in 1971, including those who
found affirmative action permissible, agreed that race-conscious
decisions were problematic.232 Given the nation's history, how
could they not? Virtually every form of race discrimination, in-
cluding segregated education itself, had been defended in part
on the ground that it was the best program to advance African-
American interests. Skepticism about the new affirmative action
programs was inevitable, especially when contrasted with the
programs in the past, in which the claims about advancing Afri-
can-American interests were simply false.
Justifiable skepticism created an analytic problem on which
the Court's internal discussions focused. During the 1970s and
1980s, equal protection cases were generally a focus of serious
controversy within the Court, in part because the Justices were
divided over whether to adopt a two-tier analysis or a three-tier
analysis. 3 Under the two-tier analysis, the Court used two
231. See generally Haywood Burns, The Activism Is Not Affirmative, in THE BUR-
GER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT 95, 103-06 (Herman
Schwartz ed., 1987).
232. See generally infra text accompanying notes 251-81.
233. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
514 [Vol. 36:473
1995] DISCRIMINATION CASES AND THE MARSHALL PAPERS 515
standards to evaluate legislation. Strict scrutiny would invali-
date a law unless it served what the Court called a "compelling
state interest" and did so in the way least intrusive on other
constitutional values, The second standard would uphold a stat-
ute if it were a rational approach to addressing a social problem.
The three-tier analysis inserted an intermediate level, which
gave more flexibility to legislatures to devise affirmative action
programs and to courts to determine whether those programs
were constitutional.'
Affirmative action programs caused several analytical prob-
lems. The cases before the era of affirmative action seemed to
say that government decisions based on race ought to receive the
highest degree of scrutiny. That view would imply that affirma-
tive action programs almost inevitably were unconstitutional.
Some Justices were not bothered by that conclusion, but others
were. One natural analytical move would be to refine the prior
cases. Instead of saying that race-conscious decisions triggered
strict scrutiny, the Court could state that only prior cases involv-
ing race-conscious government action that subordinated African-
Americans triggered strict scrutiny. Some other standard would
apply to race-conscious decisions that did not subordinate minor-
ities.
However, within the two-tier system, that analytical move
implied that affirmative action programs would be upheld if they
were rational. Such a holding would imply that all affirmative
action programs were constitutional, given the Court's state-
ments about the meaning of rationality. Not even Justice Mar-
shall took that view. Rather, the Justices who approved of affir-
mative action programs agreed that some but not all such pro-
grams were constitutional. However, this approach meant that
they could do what they wanted only by abandoning the two-tier
system in favor of a three-tier system in which affirmative ac-
tion programs received intermediate scrutiny. The difficulty
(acknowledging that "[tihere are valid reasons for dissatisfaction with the 'two tier'
approach that has been prominent in the Court's [equal protection] decisions in the
past decade").
234, See generally Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 517-22 (1980) (Marshall, J. con-
curring) (discussing rationale behind three tier review in affirmative action cases);
Marshall Papers, box 165, file 8.
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remained that several Justices who endorsed some affirmative
action programs-Justice. Powell and Chief Justice Burger in
particular-had forcefully rejected the three-tier approach in
other equal protection cases. Their struggle to develop an analy-
sis that they found satisfactory dominated the Court's first two
extended confrontations with affirmative action.
B. Justice Powell in Bakke
Allan Bakke's 1973 application to the medical school at the
Davis campus of the University of California produced the
Court's first set of opinions on affirmative action. 5 The medi-
cal school had opened only five years earlier. 6 In 1973 it oper-
ated a two-track admissions system.237 White applicants were
rejected if their grade point averages fell below 2.5; those with
better grades were rated on a 500-point scale.2 38 Applications
from members of minority groups, in contrast, were considered
by a separate student-faculty committee that did not use an
automatic cut-off.239 The medical school committed itself to ad-
mitting sixteen minority applicants in each class of one hun-
dred.240 The California Supreme Court found the Davis pro-
gram unconstitutional because it "denie[d] admission to some
white applicants solely because of their race."241' Race-conscious
decisions might be constitutional, but only if they survived "rigid
scrutiny."242 Because the program was inflexible and unneces-
sary, the state supreme court said, it was not justified.243
The university appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Brennan thought that the case was a bad vehicle for
deciding whether affirmative action was unconstitutional.2'
235. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276 (1978).
236. Id. at 272.
237. Id. at 272-73.
238. Id. at 273-74.
239. Id. at 273-75.
240. Id. at 275.
241. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1161 (Cal. 1976), affd
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
242. Id. at 1165-66.
243. Id. at 1172.
244. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME
COURT 41 (1988).
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Because the school set aside sixteen seats for minorities, it
showed that it used the sort of "rigid mathematical quota" that
nearly all the Justices in Swann found problematic. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun voted against granting re-
view, but they were joined only by Chief Justice Burger,245 who
was, as usual, unenthusiastic about getting the Court involved
in contentious public issues before it became necessary.
As Bernard Schwartz has shown, Justice Brennan focused on
two issues in preparing for the Bakke argument: Was it constitu-
tionally permissible for a university to take race into account at
all in its admission decisions, and, "should heightened standard
or rationality be applied?" 6 Brennan noted that he "lean[ed]
to the rationality standard... ."7 As he saw it, affirmative
action programs should be upheld because they met a "need for
effective social policies promoting racial justice in a society beset
by deep-rooted racial inequities."24 '
As it happened, though, the Justices never had a full-scale,
face-to-face discussion of the constitutional issues in Bakke be-
fore they began to draft their opinions. The conference discus-
sion immediately after the oral argument focused on an issue
that had arisen late in the case: whether the affirmative action
program was inconsistent with a federal civil rights statute,
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 9 Although some Justices
expressed their views on that question, most of the discussion
addressed whether the Court should schedule a new argument,
or at least ask for additional briefs, dealing solely with the stat-
utory question. In the end, a majority voted to request more
briefs."0
Before the briefs were received, Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Rehnquist circulated memoranda indicating their "tentative"
viewsY Burger wanted to affirm the state court's decision, but
245. Id. at 42.
246. Id. at 44.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 56-62.
250. Id. at 62.
251. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Conference (Oct. 21, 1977) Marshall Pa-
pers, box 204, file 3, at 1, reprinted in ScHVARTZ, supra note 244, at 167.
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"without putting the states... in a straitjacket . ,,. The
university was trying "to accomplish a number of commendable,
long-range objectives," but had used "one of the more extreme
methods of securing those objectives." 3 Burger was concerned,
though, with the "tactical consideration of how best to structure
and shape a result so as to confine its impact and yet make it
clear that the Court intends to leave states free to serve as
'laboratories' for experimenting with less rigid exclusionary
methods . *. .. ,254 He stated that he was "uneasy with the
'slogans' that have evolved in equal protection analysis," but was
inclined to "give the very closest look possible-essentially 'strict
scrutiny'-to any state action based on race.""5 Burger thought
that it was "superficial and problematic" to assert that merely
claiming a benign purpose should lower the level of scrutiny.
Doing so, he wrote, "proceeds on the dubious assumption that
minorities are readily indentifiable [sic] 'blocs' which in some
way function as units .... ."
The Chief Justice did not think that the university's "sound
and desirable objectives" justified its "rigid" program," and he
wanted the Court to "encourage efforts and experimental pro-
grams to redefine admissions criteria.., keeping in mind only
the limited constraint imposed by a narrow affirmance
here-that race alone can never be a permissible basis for ex-
cluding an applicant."258 Nonetheless, Burger's insistence on
"strict scrutiny" might have made it difficult to preserve the
flexibility he wanted the states to have. He suggested that some
alternatives would "account fully for the individual capabilities
of each minority applicant,"259 but he did not explain why a
system that took race into account at all would survive strict
scrutiny. Justice White already had, circulated a memorandum,
which he hand-delivered to Justice Marshall, saying that race-
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1-2, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 167-68.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 2, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 168.
256. Id. at 3, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 169.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 4, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 170.
259. Id.
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sensitive programs "in the end would often make race the deter-
minative factor in administering a seemingly neutral set of qual-
ifications."260 Burger agreed that this result was a serious con-
cern, but was "optimistic" that it could be handled. He wanted to
defer the Court's consideration of that question until it had some
alternative before it. "If it is to take years to work out a rational
solution of the current problem," Burger concluded, "so be it.
That is what we are paid for."26'
The tension here may indicate that Burger had not decided
how to work his views into an opinion. The tension persisted
throughout the Court's deliberation and surfaced most notably
in Justice Powell's opinion. This tension suggests the broader
problem that the Justices really were ambivalent about either
endorsing affirmative action completely or placing severe limits
on it but were committed to an analytical framework, the two-
tier system, that made intermediate positions difficult to devel-
op.
Two weeks later, Justice Rehnquist circulated a "stream of
consciousness" memorandum 262 He began by saying that the
Davis policy was "as difficult to sustain' as any affirmative ac-
tion program could be because the university "[made] no bones"
about relying solely on race."3 He also said, "difference in
treatment of individuals based on their race or ethnic origin is
at the bull's eye of the target at which [the equal protection
claim] was aimed."2" He agreed that "legislators consider ra-
cial or ethnic factors in voting on bills," but that was different
from making race "the determining factor in whether an individ-
ual receives a benefit.... 26 ' He thought that the Davis pro-
gram "clearly"2 66 satisfied the rational-basis standard, but be-
lieved that such a standard could be applied only if "whites who
260. Letter from Justice White to Conference (Oct. 13, 1977), Marshall Papers, box
204, file 3.
261. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Conference, supra note 251, at 6, reprinted
in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 172.
262. Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Conference (Nov. 11, 1977), reprinted
in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 175.
263. Id. at 1, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 176.
264. Id. at 2, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 177.
265. Id. at 3-4, reprinted in SCIVARTZ, supra note 244, at 178-79.
266. Id. at 6, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 181.
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are in the majority may not assert a claim for denial of equal
protection," a position he found "quite unsatisfying."267 That
argument "confuse[d] the substance of the prohibition with the
reason for placing the prohibition in the Constitution."268 The
Equal Protection Clause may have been included because of its
drafters' concern about discrimination against African-Ameri-
cans, but "the language they chose is a good deal more gener-
al .. 269 To satisfy the strict scrutiny requirement, "most of
the proffered non-race goals, such as more doctors in the ghetto"
were insufficient.27 And other goals, "although phrased in non-
racial terms, are, at heart, very clearly predicated at least in
part on the idea that racial characteristics are, in and of them-
selves, socially significant and permissible bases for governmen-
tal action."27' But, Rehnquist wrote, the Constitution means
that "for governmental purposes nobody 'has' anything simply by
virtue of their race."272 Finally, he found "unacceptable" the
idea that "past societal discrimination justifies these affirmative
action programs""' because "the right not to be discriminated
against is personal to the individual, and, in this case, Bakke's
right to equal protection of the laws cannot be denied him sim-
ply because at some other place or at some other time minority
group members have been discriminated against."274 The broad
racial category did not "fit" the subcategory of those who had
been discriminated against because of race. "[J]ust because it is
easier to identify blacks than people who have suffered discrimi-
nation on account of race, the state should not be excused from
making a more individualized determination.""5
Rehnquist had "no doubt" that programs seeking out "cultur-
ally deprived [or] disadvantaged" people would be valid, and he
agreed that universities could "recruit heavily among minority
267. Id. at 7, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 182.
268. Id. at 9, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 184.
269. Id. at 7, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 182.
270. Id. at 12, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 187.
271. Id. at 13, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 188.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 14, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 189.
274. Id. at 14-15, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 189-90.
275. Id. at 16, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 191.
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students ... 276 On an issue that Justice White had raised,
Rehnquist did not think the Court had to decide whether race
could be "used as one of a number of factors," but he noted that
his analysis would make it "difficult ... to allow express consid-
eration of race as a substantial factor at all."277 Burger's letter
indicated a desire to allow some affirmative action programs,
even as it stated that strict scrutiny had to be applied.
Rehnquist's memorandum expressed no such desire, and showed
that it would be difficult for Burger to invoke the two-tier anal-
ysis while allowing some forms of affirmative action.
With Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall firmly committed
to upholding the Davis program, the votes of Justices Powell and
Blackmun were crucial. Shortly after the Court received the
additional briefs on Title VI, Justice Powell circulated a memo-
randum dealing only with the constitutional question. Bernard
Schwartz notes that Justice Powell's memorandum "was virtual-
ly identical" to the opinion he published.27 The "crucial battle,"
Powell wrote, is "over the proper scope of judicial review."279
Because the Davis program used "a line drawn on the basis of
race," ° strict scrutiny had to be applied because "racial and
ethnic classifications.., are odious."281
In reviewing the nation's racial and ethnic history, Powell
argued that many minority groups had "to overcome the preju-
dices not of a monolithic majority, but of a 'majority' composed of
various minority groups." 2 Indeed, "[tihe concepts of 'majority'
and 'minority' necessarily reflect temporary judgments and polit-
ical arrangements.... [Tihe white 'majority' itself is composed
of various minority groups, each of which can lay claim to a
history of prior discrimination at the hands of the state and
private individuals."' Marshall reacted strongly to this
276. Id. at 18, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 193.
277. Id.
278. SCMVARTZ, supra note 244, at 81.
279. Id. at 82.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 82-83.
282. Memorandum & Draft Opinion from Justice Powell to Conference (Nov. 22,
1977) at 6, reprinted in SCIARTZ, supra note 244, at 203.
283. Id. at 8-9, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 205-06.
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thought, scrawling "Kennedy was President" on his copy of a
later draft making the same point.2' Powell, however, ob-
served that the Court could not use a standard that would make
its analysis "vary with the ebb and flow of political forces."'
Constitutional principles could not be applied consistently if they
depended on "shifting political and social judgments."8 6
Accordingly, for Powell, "[t]here [was] no principled basis for
deciding which groups [would] merit 'heightened judicial
solicitude' and which [groups would] not." ' Further, "it
[might] not always be clear that a so-called preference [was] in
fact benign."28 Some members of a group might be harmed "in
order to advance the group's general interest."2 9 Again Mar-
shall disagreed, writing "[wihat about veterans preferences" on
his copy.290 In any event, Powell noted, "there is no warrant in
the Constitution for forcing innocent persons" like Bakke "to
bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their mak-
ing.,
291
With strict scrutiny as the standard, Powell asked whether
the Davis program was justified. Governments could try to
"ameliorat[e] ... the disabling effects of past discrimination,"
but they could not rely on "societal discrimination," which ac-
cording to Powell was "a concept of injury that may be ageless in
its reach into the past."292 Only if specific findings of past dis-
crimination were made could the university attempt to overcome
its effects. 3
Powell did find "the attainment of a diverse student body" to
be a permissible goal, because students with particular back-
284. Justice Powell, Draft Opinion (Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke) (May 9,
1978), Marshall Papers, box 203, file 7, at 22.
285. Justice Powell, Draft Opinion (Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke) (Nov. 22,
1977) at 10, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 207.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 9, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 206.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Justice Powell, Draft Opinion (Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke) (May 9,
1978), Marshall Papers, box 203, file 7, at 26.
291. Justice Powell, Draft Opinion (Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke) (Nov. 22,
1977) at 9-10, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 206-07.
292. Id. at 18, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 215.
293. Id.
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grounds may bring "experiences, outlooks and ideas that enrich
the training of its student body."294 Focusing solely on race,
however, did not serve that goal. Quoting a Harvard admissions
policy, Powell observed that race was but one of many factors
that added a "'plus' in a particular applicant's file."295
Powell attempted to address White's observation that treating
race as a "plus" inevitably meant that race would sometimes be
dispositive by asserting that only good faith administration of
the plan would be required. 96 This assertion, however, misun-
derstood White's point. White did not mean that universities
would use Harvard-type systems as a disguise for policies that
were based solely on race. Rather, White meant that when race
was a "plus" in one person's file, a candidate who, except for the
plus, had an identical file would be denied admission solely
because of race. Given Powell's emphasis on individual rights, it
is hard to see why a Harvard-type system really overcame
Powell's objections to the Davis program.
According to Bernard Schwartz, Justice Brennan wrote a
memorandum attempting "to persuade Powell" to uphold the
Davis program. 7 If persuading Powell was Brennan's aim, he
failed, for Powell's final opinion differed only in structure, not in
content, from his initial draft. More likely, however, Brennan
had a different concern. The Court was to discuss Bakke again
on December 9.29' By late November, all the drafts circulating
among the Justices came out against the Davis program. To
ensure that the December discussion would have some paper
laying out the argument in favor of the program, Brennan circu-
lated his own views. 99
Brennan's memorandum began with a statement addressing
what had emerged as the central issue, whether an affirmative
action program that took race into account was constitutional.
For him, the Court "long ago crossed that bridge in cases that
294. Id. at 20-21, reprinted in SCMVARTZ, supra note 244, at 217-19.
295. Id. at 24, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 221.
296. Id. at 25, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 222.
297. SCHNVARTZ, supra note 244, at 87.
298. Id. at 93-94.
299. Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Conference (Nov. 23, 1977), reprinted in
SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 227-44.
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approved race-sensitive policies."00 Further, the NAACP Legal
Def6nse Fund brief demonstrated that "to read the Fourteenth
Amendment to state an abstract principle of color-blindness," as
Rehnquist and Powell asserted, was "itself to be blind to histo-
ry."301 Rather, states could "pursue the goal of racial plural-
ism ... in order to afford minorities full participation in the
broader society."0 2 That so few minority physicians had been
admitted to Davis before it began its program showed that it
was entitled to adopt the program "to achieve the participation
of minorities in the profession as an end in itself."
303
Brennan then addressed the means Davis chose to pursue the
goal of minority participation. Its program was clearly not "a
governmental slur of whites." He considered Davis' purposes: bi-
racial association in medical school to "decrease the degree to
which whites think of blacks, not as people, but as a race, and
thus the degree to which blacks think of themselves as inferior,"
and a desire to provide minority role-models.34 Brennan in-
voked his twenty-one years on the Court to point out the ele-
ment missing in Bakke-stigma or invidiousness. The principle
that emerged from the cases, Brennan said, was that "govern-
ment may not, on account of race, insult or demean a human be-
ing by stereotyping his or her capacities, integrity, or worth as
an individual."3 5 Although "Bakke, like thousands of other ap-
plicants who fail of admission, was not admitted to medical
school ... he was never stereotyped as an incompetent, or
pinned with a badge of inferiority because he is white."30 6
With this background, Brennan asserted that "under any
standard of ... review other than one requiring absolute color-
blindness," Davis's program was constitutional.0 7 Any alterna-
tives towards achieving greater integration of the medical school
300. Id. at 2, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 228.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 4, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 230.
304. Id. at 5, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 231.
305. Id. at 7, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 233.
306. Id. at 9, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 235.
307. Id. at 10, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 236.
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were "fanciful.""' A pure merit-based system, Brennan as-
sumed, "would achieve significant integration," but medical
schools had not yet devised such a system.3 9 For example, so-
cial scientific evidence showed that "formal, cognitive predictors
of academic success understate minority applicants' ability to
perform well vis-a-vis white applicants."310 Picking up Burger's
theme, Brennan wrote that he "would not abort... experiments
and hamstring the efforts of educators to develop sound admis-
sions programs."' After having made "certain that particular
whites [were] not unfairly singled out to their unique disadvan-
tage," the Court should ask only whether Davis' policy was "rea-
sonable and considered.., in light of the alternatives available
and the opportunities that it [left] open for whites."" 2
Finally, Brennan agreed with White that the Court was "de-
luding" itself if it thought there was "a meaningful, judicially
enforceable distinction" between programs that set aside a spe-
cific "number of places for qualified minorities and a process
that accomplishe[d] the same end by taking race into ac-
count."" 3 Admissions decisions were inevitably subjective, and
"[hiow much weight a faculty admissions committee decide[d] to
allow the factor of race [would] almost certainly depend on how
many minority applicants should be admitted." "
With these memoranda in hand, the Court considered Bakke
on December 9. Justice Blackmun's position remained unclear;
he could not attend the conference because he was recovering
from surgery and had not devoted much attention to the addi-
tional briefs or the memoranda he had received. Two develop-
ments occurred during the discussion. Justice Stewart asserted
that because "[n]o state agency can take race into account," the
Davis program was unconstitutional.1 For the first time, it
was clear that a majority favored ordering Davis to abandon its
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 11, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 237.
311. Id. at 13, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 239.
312. Id. at 14, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 240.
313. Id. at 15, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 241.
314. Id. at 15-16, reprinted in SCHVARTZ, supra note 244, at 241-42.
315. SCHVARTZ, supra note 244, at 95.
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program. The second development was the confirmation that
four votes existed for the proposition that affirmative action pro-
grams that took race into account were constitutional. Justice
Brennan persuaded Powell that the state supreme court's opin-
ion held that race could never be taken into account. As a result,
Powell agreed that the case should be affirmed in part-holding
the Davis program unconstitutional-and reversed in
part-allowing Davis to develop an alternative Harvard-type
program. By ensuring that the disposition would include a par-
tial reversal, Brennan was able to assert some control over the
"spin" the decision would receive when announced. He could
stress in his opinion that a majority actually approved some
affirmative action programs, and he could take some satisfaction
in believing, with Justice White, that programs taking race into
account were functionally identical to apparently more rigid
programs like Davis'."'
After the conference, Justice Stevens provoked a flurry of
memoranda by arguing that Brennan and Powell had misinter-
preted the state supreme court's judgment.317 Although the
California court's opinion spoke more broadly, the judgment
itself only barred Davis from "considering [Bakke's] race or the
race of any other applicant in passing upon his application for
admission."31 As Stevens accurately noted, the court's opinion
rather clearly did not bar Davis from taking race into account in
some redesigned affirmative action program. Brennan and White
wanted to guarantee that the Court's judgment was not a flat
affirmance of the state supreme court's decision, and they circu-
lated elaborate memoranda trying to explain why that court's
judgment really did require some form of reversal.31 9 The tech-
nical points they made-in response, it should be noted, to
Stevens' technical point-carried little weight. What mattered
was Powell's desire to obtain approval of Harvard-type programs
316. For a general discussion of the December 9 conference, see id. at 93-98.
317. Id. at 100-01.
318. Revised Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan (Dec. 12, 1977), Mar-
shall Papers, box 204, file 3.
319. See Memorandum from Justice White to Conference (Dec. 12, 1977), Marshall
Papers, box 204, file 3; Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Conference (Dec. 13,
1977), Marshall Papers, box 204, file 2.
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"in the unlikely but welcome event that a consensus develop[ed]
for allowing the competitive consideration of race as an ele-
ment."2 ' The only question that remained was exactly how to
achieve this consensus. The easiest way was to ignore Stevens's
technical point, which is what the majority favoring allowing
states to take race into account did. Otherwise, as Justice Powell
stated a few weeks later, the Court "would merely perpetuate
the confusion and doubt that... exist[ed]."32'
By the end of December it was clear that there were at least
five votes to strike down Davis' program, and four to state ex-
pressly that programs taking race into account were constitu-
tional. Whether there would be five votes for the latter propo-
sition depended on Justice Blackmun.322 He gave no signals
about his views for several months. The Court's senior Justices,
concerned in large part with expediting the Court's work, tried
to pressure Blackmun, with no success. Bernard Schwartz de-
scribes several outbursts by Blackmun at what Blackmun re-
garded as unjustified criticism for holding up the Court's work.
It is worth noting, however, that Blackmun's reactions had no
impact on the outcome; instead Brennan, and perhaps other Jus-
tices, came to appreciate more clearly "the enormous strain"
Blackmun was under as a result of his surgery and his efforts to
carry a full load of Court work.3"
Justice Marshall rarely took part in any personal efforts to
affect outcomes. However, he too became impatient. In late
March he started work on a separate opinion in Bakke. Ordi-
narily Marshall told his law clerks the points he wanted to
make, leaving them to draft an opinion. Marshall cared so much
about Bakke that he blocked out the opinion himself. His hand-
written draft expresses his impatience, perhaps less with
Blackmun than with all his colleagues for their obtuseness.
320. SCMVARTZ, supra note 244, at 105.
321. Id. at 112.
322. Id. at 120.
323. Id. at 123-27. Schwartz speculates that Brennan was reluctant to prod
Blackmun too forcefully, fearing that Blackmun would vote out of irritation against
allowing race to be taken into account. Id. at 123. The more plausible interpretation
is simply that people got impatient because the Court's work was moving along too
slowly.
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I repeat, for next to the last time, the decision in this case
depends on whether you consider the action... as "admit-
ting" certain students or as "excluding" certain other stu-
dents. Toward one end we see "complete equality". ... To-
ward the other end we see "quotas" "Constitution is color
blind" etc. Take your choice.
We should have known we would get to this point. We are
up to it. Do we really mean it. 4
Marshall's impatience came through again when he wrote, "so
many real good Americans often say: 'Segregation and racial
discrimination are bad, should be condemned and must
stop-but-move a Negro in a house next to mine-well, that is
something different."'325 For Marshall, the analogy seemed so
clear that he did not need to spell it out, nor could he have done
so: His colleagues were willing to endorse desegregation when it
did not affect them, but when it came closer to home-in the
universities that they and their children attended-they balked.
Marshall thought the Court was presented a case "with a
lousy record and [a] poorly reasoned lower court opinion."326 In
deciding, Marshall "address[ed] the question of whether Negroes
'had] 'arrived' or other variations of 'the Constitution is color-
blind."'"2 7 Here he was acerbic:
Remember, that statement was in the dissenting opinion in
Plessy. Had it been in the majority we would not be faced
with the problem in 1977. We are not yet all equals. As to
this country being a melting pot-either the Negro did not
get in the pot or he did not get melted down.3"
He pointed out that the Court itself was part of the problem-it
had never had an African-American "officer of... [the] Court,"
and had hired "only three Negro law clerks."" 9
Marshall's clerks reshaped the notes, retaining many of
324. Justice Marshall, Draft Opinion (Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke), Mar-
shall Papers, box 204, file 2, at 1.
325. Id. at 1-2.
326. Id. at 2.
327. Id. at 3.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 4.
528 [Vol. 36:473
19951 DISCRIMINATION CASES AND* THE MARSHALL PAPERS 529
Marshall's comments. The point about Plessy was sharpened:
"We are... not yet all equals, in large part because of the refus-
al of the Plessy Court to adopt the principle of color-blindness. It
would be cruelest irony for this Court to adopt the dissent in
Plessy now."
330
For all of Brennan's efforts, it appears to have been Marshall's
opinion that most affected Blackmun."' Three weeks after
Marshall's opinion was circulated, Blackmun sent his own mem-
orandum.3 2 In typical Blackmun fashion, it had numbered
paragraphs, the last of which stated that, "[t]here [was] much to
be said for Thurgood's 'cruelest irony' approach."133 His memo-
randum began with some "[g]eneral [clonsiderations," which, like
Marshall's, were some diffuse observations that indicated
Blackmun's mood as he approached the case. Citing statistics
about minority group professionals, Blackmun wrote:
If ways are not found to remedy this situation, the Country
can never achieve its professed goal of a society that is not
race conscious .... [He] hope[d] that the time soon [would]
come when an "affirmative action" program [was] unneces-
sary,... [but] we must reach a stage of maturity, .beyond
any transitional inequality, where action along this line is no
longer necessary. Then persons may be regarded as persons,
and past discrimination will be an ugly feature of history
that has been overcome.
34
Blackmun thought it
somewhat ironic [to be] so convulsed and deeply disturbed
over a program where race is an element of consciousness,
and yet to be aware of the fact that institutions of higher
learning for many years have given conceded preferences up
to a point to the skilled athlete... and to those having con-
330. SCHVARTZ, supra note 244, at 129.
331. According to Schwartz, Brennan was concerned that "Marshall's underlying
theory was 'Goddamnit, you owe us,' and he feared that theory would not be persua-
sive to Justice Blackmun." Id.
332. Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to Conference (May 1, 1978), reprinted in
ScHVARTz, supra note 244, at 247-59.
333. Id. at 12, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 258.
334. Id. at 2, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 248.
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nections with celebrities and the famous."a 5
Blackmun insisted that the Justices understand that "[tihis is
not an ideal world.... [W]e live in a real world," and the deci-
sion must reflect reality. 36 Rehnquist's position, in contrast,
sought "idealistic equality."33 7 Blackmun observed that Alexan-
der Bickel's criticisms of affirmative action
speak of the idealistic and have great appeal. But I say, once
more, that this is not an ideal world, yet. And, of course, his
position is-and I hope I offend no one, for I do not mean to
do so-the "accepted" Jewish approach.... They understand-
ably want "pure" equality and are willing to take their chanc-
es with it, knowing that they have the inherent ability to
excel and live with it successfully.33
For Blackmun, "[ain admissions policy that has an awareness
of race as an element seem[ed] ... to be the only possible and
realistic means of achieving the.., goal" of a non-race conscious
society.339 Taking a modest position, Blackmun wrote that the
state supreme court's judgment "did not prevent" the Court from
"decid[ing] whether race can ever be a permissible consider-
ation."34° Powell's attack on Davis's "blatant quota system" was
"effective[]," but Blackmun believed that "the line between the
Harvard program and the Davis program [was] a thin one....
At worst, one could say that under the Harvard program one
[might] accomplish covertly what Davis [did] openly."341 In the
end, he believed that "the Davis program [was] within consti-
tutional bounds, though perhaps barely so."
342
With Blackmun's vote, the case was essentially over. Burger
and Brennan worked out a formal assignment of the case to
Powell, to announce the Court's judgment and to provide what
Powell called a "roadmap" explaining what the different majori-
335. Id. at 4-5, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 250-51.
336. Id. at 2, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 248.
337. Id. at 8, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 254.
338. Id. at 11-12, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 257-58.
339. Id. at 5, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 251.
340. Id. at 7-8, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 253-54.
341. Id. at 10, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 256.
342. Id. at 10-11, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 256-57.
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ties held. Brennan drafted the opinion that later appeared as his
partial dissent and which Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun quickly joined. They also prepared their own shorter
opinions. Powell rather genially took exception to a statement in
Brennan's opinion describing the "central meaning" of the judg-
ment to be "[g]overnment may take race into account when it
acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy
disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice."43
This statement, Powell. thought, went "somewhat beyond" the
actual holding, although it might be a fair statement of the
holding's implications.3 " Even more genially, Powell sent a
note to his colleagues with the draft of the statement he pro-
posed to use in announcing the Court's judgment stating, "As I
am a 'chief with no 'indians,' I should be in the rear rank, not
up front!"
345
Powell was genial in part, of course, because that was his na-
ture. He was also genial, however, because the Court's divisions
in Bakke never became contentious. The Justices stated their
positions-or, in Blackmun's case, did not state a position for a
long time-and that pretty much was that. The Court's delib-
erations in subsequent affirmative action cases had the same
character.
C. Chief Justice Burger in Fullilove
According to one of Justice Marshall's law clerks, Fullilove v.
Klutznick3 46 was "more important than Bakke, since [it] in-
volve[d] an affirmative action plan developed by Congress."
3 47
In Fullilove, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a program
in which ten percent of the federal funds for public works pro-
jects had to be allocated for services supplied by businesses
owned by members of minority groups."
Throughout the Court's deliberations, Chief Justice Burger
343. SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 137.
344. Id. at 140.
345. Id. at 141.
346. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
347. Philip Frickey, Bench Memo (Fullilove v. Kreps), Marshall Papers, box 239,
file 9, at 1.
348. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492.
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restated the view he expressed in Bakke that "slogans" were
unhelpful in resolving the case.39 His statement to the confer-
ence emphasized the fact that Congress was the decision-maker.
The Court had to show "deference to Congress."350 Although
some aspects of Congress' list of minority groups troubled Bur-
ger, he did not think that Congress had to make "explicit find-
ing[s]" about discrimination against "Indians and blacks."35" '
Justice Powell, in contrast, "want[ed] definitive findings," but he
thought that the "record" in Fullilove was "adequate": Although
Congress had not held hearings on the particular bill at issue in
Fullilove, the need for a set-aside program had been expressed
repeatedly in other congressional proceedings. 52
Because the case was so important, the Chief Justice assigned
the opinion to himself. Although the Court heard argument in
late November 1979, Burger's draft opinion was not circulated
until late May 1980."'3 Its basic structure survived in the pub-
lished opinion, but it was not an opinion for the Court. Burger's
draft can best be understood as an extended description of the
federal statute, presented to show that Congress' decision made
sense, but without containing much conventional legal analysis.
The draft described prior cases, pointed out parallels to
Fullilove, and left readers to make the necessary connections.
On June 4, 1980, Justices Brennan and Marshall sent Jus-
tices White and Blackmun a draft letter they proposed to send to
Burger. The letter expressed concern that the diffuse legal anal-
ysis in Burger's draft did not define the constitutional limits on
Congress' spending power. In their view, the opinion should
have said that when Congress employed racial categories "to
accomplish the important objective of remedying past discrim-
ination," its methods "must be narrowly tailored to the achieve-
ment of that goal."354 In light of Bakke, this statement meant
349. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to Conference (June 18, 1980) Mar-
shall Papers, box 248, file 8; Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to Conference
(June 9, 1980), Marshall Papers, box 248, file 8.
350. SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 158.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 159.
353. Chief Justice Burger, Draft Opinion (Fullilove v. Klutznick) (May 30, 1980),
Marshall Papers, box 248, file 8.
354. Draft Letter from Justices Brennan and Marshall to Chief Justice Burger
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that the test was intermediate scrutiny.
After the letter was sent and circulated to the other Justices,
Justice Powell countered by insisting that the test should be
strict scrutiny.'4' Justice Blackmun then indicated that he too
was "somewhat troubled" by the absence in the Burger draft of a
well-defined standard of review." 6 The Chief Justice replied to
his critics on both sides, "I do not share the passion expressed by
some for stating 'tests.' The test is the Constitution."5 ' None-
theless, on June 16 he circulated a revision, incorporating some
of Brennan and Marshall's suggestions, but also including a dis-
claimer:
Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must neces-
sarily receive a most searching examination to make sure
that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees. Some
have characterized such examination as a 'test;" it is not es-
sential that these standards of review be characterized as one
degree or another in the hierachy [sic] of judicial analysis.
What is essential is that any enactment of Congress which
employs racial or ethnic criteria receives probing examina-
tion. This case... has received.., that kind of exainna-
tion .... 358
Justices Brennan and Marshall said they appreciated Burger's
revisions, but that they objected to the disclaimer. They told
their colleagues that they planned to circulate a concurring
opinion "that articulate[d their] view of the correct standard and
[that] explain[ed] how that standard [was] implicit in the analy-
sis" applied to Fullilove.359 At this point Burger lost patience.
"[lit seems to me there is a 'tempest in a saucer' aspect as to
terms," he wrote his colleagues. 6' "I frankly believe that
(June 4, 1980), Marshall Papers, box 248, file 8.
355. Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger (June 5, 1980), Marshall
Papers, box 248, file 8.
356. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Chief Justice Burger (June 9, 1980), Marshall
Papers, box 248, file 8.
357. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Conference (June 9, 1980), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 248, file 8.
358. Chief Justice Burger, Draft Opinion (Fullilove v. Klutznick) (June 16, 1980),
Marshall Papers, box 248, file 8, at 39.
359. Letter from Justices Brennan and Marshall to Chief Justice Burger (June 17,
1980), Marshall Papers, box 248, file 8.
360. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Conference (June 18, 1980), Marshall Pa-
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terms," he wrote his colleagues.36 "I frankly believe that
adopting a magic 'word-test' is a serious error and I will neither
write nor join in these 'litmus' approaches." 61 He also insisted
that his opinion speak for itself: "I am not prepared to subscribe
to a Court opinion that is undermined by concurring opinions
which undertake to say that the author of the Court opinion
adopts a particular test."362 Moreover, on June 20 the Chief
Justice strengthened the disclaimer, revising the opinion to
state: "This opinion does not adopt, either expressly or implicit-
ly, the formulas of analysis articulated in" Bakke.3"
Justice Marshall got the point, and circulated an opinion con-
curring in the result, which Justices Brennan and Blackmun
joined." Justice Powell, in contrast, wrote separately but con-
curred in Burger's opinion, observing that he would have pre-
ferred the lead opinion to "articulate judicial standards of review
in conventional terms," but joining it because he viewed it "as
substantially in accord" with his own views.36
For lawyers, Fullilove was important because it was more
generous about set-asides adopted by Congress than Bakke had
been about set-asides adopted by states. Most striking about the
Court's internal discussions, though, is that a solid majority of
six quickly agreed on the result, and no one wavered. Further,
no one expressed suspicion that the Chief Justice had taken the
opinion intending to write it in a way that would cast doubt on
the majority's commitment to its result. Justices Marshall and
Brennan would have reached that result by applying intermedi-
ate scrutiny,366 while Justice Powell did so by applying a strict-
er standard."7 Under the circumstances, Burger's inclination
to paper over the disagreement by refusing to be explicit about a
360. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Conference (June 18, 1980), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 248, file 8.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Conference (June 20, 1980), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 248, file 8.
364. Justice Marshall, First Printed Draft Opinion (Fullilove v. Klutznick) (June 24,
1980), Marshall Papers, box 248, file 7.
365. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 495-96 (Powell, J., concurring).
366. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
367. Id. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring).
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review were primarily concerned not with legal doctrine, but
with the signals that the Court sent to lower courts and to the
public about what it believed was constitutionally permissible.
Invoking a strict standard preserved the two-tier structure that
promised to limit the judicial role in evaluating legislation. Us-
ing such a standard, even in the course of upholding a racial
categorization as Justice Powell would have done, would signal
that the result was extraordinary. From Powell's perspective,
Burger's diffuse opinion threatened to undermine the clarity of
the two-tier structure." In contrast, Justices Marshall and
Brennan were committed to a three-tier analysis and did what-
ever possible to advance that cause. 69 They cared about the
issue because the intermediate tier gave courts more latitude to
overturn legislation.7
As they saw it, the two-tier structure made it too easy for judg-
es to say that, although they believed that a statute was serious-
ly unwise, it was not irrational."' The three-tier structure
gave such judges another means by which to find such statutes
unconstitutional and deprived them of an easy rhetorical "out"
by deferring to legislative judgment. 372
A detailed description of the internal divisions over standards
of review is beyond the scope of this Article, but a quick over-
view may provide a framework within which the discussions in
Fullilove can be better understood. In 1976 the Justices engaged
in a long and, as they saw it, painful dispute over the precise
phrasing of the minimal rationality standard.3 Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia 4 involved a challenge to a
mandatory retirement program as unconstitutional age discrimi-
nation. All the Justices except Marshall agreed that the statute
was constitutional and that the appropriate standard was mini-
368. See id. at 495-96 (Powell, J., concurring).
369. See id. at 519 (Marshall J., concurring).
370. See id. ("[Blecause a racial classification ostensibly designed for remedial pur-
poses is susceptible to misuse, it may be justified only by showing 'an important and
articulated purpose for its use.').
371. See id. at 518-22.
372. See id.
373. For a documented record of the exchange between the Justices regarding the
dispute over the minimum rationality standard, see Marshall Papers, box 165, file 8.
374. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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mal rationality. 5 Justice Brennan drafted an opinion to which
Justice Rehnquist took serious exception.37 6 Rehnquist per-
suaded his conservative colleagues that Brennan's draft defined
minimum rationality in a way that would give lower courts too
much leeway to strike down legislation they thought unwiseY
Eventually Brennan lost his majority, and Justice Powell took
over the opinion. 37' His own effort to provide a definition,
though, was criticized almost as severely, and in the end the
decision did not do much in the way of "defining" the
standard.17' As Powell noted a few years later when the Court
revisited the minimal rationality standard in United States
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,"80 his "effort in Murgia to
formulate a -rational basis standard to which we all could sub-
scribe" got "caught in a 'cross-fire.' 38 ' Moreover, in yet another
iteration in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,8 2 when
Justice White attempted to offer a precise definition of the two-
tier structure, Justice Powell objected.3" Justice White's draft
opinion would have held that the court of appeals mistakenly
treated the mentally retarded as a "quasi-suspect class."3M In
White's view, the proper model was the two-tier structure, and
he would have remanded the case for the lower courts to consid-
er whether the city's action satisfied the less strict minimum
rationality requirement.385
In contrast, Justice Powell believed that the city had failed to
375. See Justice Marshall, First Draft Opinion (dissenting) (Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia) (Apr. 1, 1976), Marshall Papers, box 165, file 8, at 1.
376. Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Brennan (Jan. 30, 1976), Marshall
Papers, box 165, file 8.
377. Id. at 1.
378. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Conference (May 19, 1976), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 165, file 8.
379. For a documented record of the exchange regarding Justice Powell's definition,
see Marshall Papers, box 165, file 8.
380. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
381. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Rehnquist (Nov. 10, 1980), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 268, file 6, at 1.
382. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
383. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice White (June 5, 1985), Marshall Papers,
box 371, file 11.
384. Justice White, Draft Opinion, (City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.) (May
29, 1985), Marshall Papers, box 371, file 11, at 8.
385. Id. at 13.
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provide any justification for its denial of a special use permit for
a group home for the mentally retarded. 86 Its action therefore
failed the minimal rationality requirement. To Justice Powell,
that failure meant that the Court did not have to decide whether
the mentally retarded fell into some intermediate category.387
Justice Rehnquist immediately responded that, although he
could go along with applying the rationality test, the opinion
should not "punt" on the issue of whether intermediate scrutiny
was appropriate.388 Justice White then played a strong card,
saying that, although he could write an opinion reaching Justice
Powell's result, he would not write an opinion that did not dis-
cuss the standard of review. The opinion therefore would have to
be reassigned. 89 Because the Court was near the end of its
Term, that was that; White had his way.90
Although these discussions of equal protection theory were
certainly divisive, they were certainly not contentious. As I have
suggested, the reasons for the divisions were largely theoretical,
in an academic and pejorative sense. The outcomes of the cases
in the Supreme Court were never in doubt. The doctrinal impli-
cations for closely related cases would have been equally clear,
or obscure, no matter what standard of review the Court adopt-
ed. What divided the Justices appears to have been a disagree-
ment about whether to adopt a two-tier or three-tier structure.
That issue seems to have mattered to them because of what the
alternatives might have suggested to lower courts: a sense of
constraint under the two-tier structure or a sense of greater
possibility under the three-tier structure. In this instance, surely
Chief Justice Burger's instinct in Fullilove was right: It is better
to write a diffuse opinion reaching a result on which all agreed
than to attempt a false precision that divided the majority.
386. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice White (June 5, 1985), Marshall Papers,
box 371, file 11 ("It has submitted no justification for treating the mentally retarded
as comparable-for zoning purposes-to the insane, alcoholics and drug addicts.").
387. Id.
388. Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Justice White (June 5, 1985), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 371, file 11.
389. Letter from Justice White to Justice Powell (June 6, 1985), Marshall Papers,
box 371, file 11
390. See Letter from Justice Powell to Justice White (June 7, 1985), Marshall pa-
pers, box 371, file 11.
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Chief Justice Burger's instinct in Fullilove was right: It is better
to write a diffuse opinion reaching a result on which all agreed
than to attempt a false precision that divided the majority.
D. Working Out the Contours of Affirmative Action
The Justices probably understood that Bakke was only their
first confrontation with the issue of affirmative action. The fact
that Justice Powell spoke only for himself and nonetheless de-
fined "the law" that emerged from Bakke is symptomatic of the
Court's groping for a position on affirmative action.391 Over the
next fifteen years the Justices gradually developed a set of dis-
tinctions-between court-ordered and voluntary affirmative ac-
tion programs and among programs with effects on hiring, pro-
motion, and discharge-that made sense to them.392 Here too,
the Court was divided but largely harmonious. 93
One dimension of disagreement surfaced first in Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co.3" The Court held that district
courts ordinarily should award seniority retroactive to the date
of an individual's job application, once they found that an em-
ployer had violated the federal statutory ban on employment
discrimination.9 ' Doing so would usually place the plaintiffs
higher on the seniority list than some other employees, who in
turn might be laid off earlier than they would have been if the
plaintiffs did not get seniority relief.396 The inequity of that re-
sult concerned Justice Powell.397 He believed seniority relief
affected the rights of "innocent employees," who might not have
had any involvement with the employer's discriminatory poli-
cies.398 In response, Justice Brennan pointed out that the
plaintiffs, who had been discriminated against, were surely
391. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267-68 (1978); see also UROFSKY, supra note 5, at
45.
392. See generally UROFSKY, supra note 5, at 39-55, 103-16 (discussing the Court's
development of its position on affirmative action programs).
393. Id.
394. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
395. Id. at 767-68, 779-80.
396. Id. at 767.
397. Id. at 782 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
398. Id. at 788-89.
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equally innocent. 99 As Justice Powell stated, "[tihis case is be-
coming a bit like a 'shuttlecock,' but I certainly don't want Bill
Brennan to have the last 'hit."'400 Justice Marshall tried to
calm the waters, pointing out that the case was narrower than
many: "In this case we deal only with identifiable individuals
who actually applied for jobs and were discriminated against...
and leave for another day the knotty problems of quotas, non-
identifiable discriminatees, and discrimination claimed by those
who were deterred from ever applying for jobs."4"'
Powell eventually gained a majority for his view that the im-
pact of affirmative action on layoffs was a central concern. In
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,"2 the Court invalidat-
ed an affirmative action program that attempted to preserve the
gains made under earlier affirmative action efforts by requiring
that some white teachers be laid off before African-American
teachers with less seniority.4 ' The issue of the appropriate
standard of review, so important in Fullilove, resurfaced in
Wygant. As in Fullilove, the conference discussion showed a ma-
jority in favor of striking down the affirmative action program,
but division among the majority on the standard of review.40 4
Because of this division, Justice Powell's first draft obscured the
standard of review.40 5 Justice Marshall circulated a proposed
dissent, which sharply criticized Powell for "[playing no heed to
the significant division on the Court with respect to a standard
of review."40 6 In a personal note, Justice Brennan told Mar-
399. See Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Conference (Jan. 29, 1976), Mar-
shall Papers, box 162, file 5, at 3 ("[The effect of the presumption is to divvy up
the burden between innocent white employees and equally innocent victims of racial
discrimination.").
400. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Conference (Feb. 12, 1976), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 162, file 5, at 1.
401. Memorandum from Justice Marshall to Conference (Feb. 16, 1976), Marshall
Papers, box 162, file 5, at 2.
402. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
403. Id. at 283-84.
404. See Letter from Justice Brennan to Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
(Nov. 20, 1985), Marshall Papers, box 387, file 1.
405. See Justice Powell, Draft Opinion (Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.) (Dec. 13,
1985), Marshall Papers, box 387, file 1.
406. Justice Marshall, Draft Opinion (Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.) (Feb. 5,
1986), Marshall Papers, box 387, file 1, at 7.
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shall that his "superb dissent.., ought to change some
votes."407
In one sense, it did change votes. Justice Powell could not
gain five votes for his opinion, and he circulated a revision more
than two months later in which he included an extended discus-
sion of the standard of review. °5 That -discussion was enough
to persuade Justice O'Connor to join most of the opinion, but
Justice White still refused to join it. The resulting plurality
opinion left the law uncertain.0 9 As one of Marshall's clerks
stated a few years later, in a memorandum on City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co.,41 "it is hard to tell whether the... [court
of appeals] has 'misread' Wygant, since nobody knows what that
opinion stands for now that Justice Powell has retired.""'
What it stood for, though, was that the Constitution placed
limits on the effects affirmative action could have on what Jus-
tice Powell called "innocent parties." '412 Justice Powell ex-
pressed that view when, with the opinions in Wygant still circu-
lating, he voted to uphold an affirmative action plan in Local 28
of the Sheet Metal Workers' National Ass'n v. EEOC."3 In that
case, a district court found that the union had discriminated
against African-Americans in admission to the union, and the
court imposed a quite rigid numerical membership "goal" as a
remedy."4 Justice Powell thought that the record reflected
"gross discrimination... and, importantly for [him], unlike
Wygant, there [was] nothing before [the Court] to suggest that
individual union members will have to be laid off."415
Local 28 differed from Wygant in another dimension that the
407. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Marshall (Feb. 6, 1986), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 387, file 1.
408. Justice Powell, Draft Opinion (Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.) (Apr. 14,
1986), Marshall Papers, box 387, file 1, at 8-9.
409. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 269 (1986).
410. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
411. Carol Steiker, Bench Memo (City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.), Marshall
Papers, box 429, file 4.
412. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282.
413. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
414. Id. at 431-32.
415. Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger (Mar. 6, 1986), Marshall
Papers, box 390, file 1; see also Local 28, 478 U.S. at 488 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Justices regarded as significant. It involved a court-ordered affir-
mative action program.4"6 The distinction between court-or-
dered plans and voluntary plans first surfaced in McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.417 Two white employees who
were fired for stealing alleged that they had been discriminated
against because an African-American co-employee charged with
the same offense had not been fired. The lower courts dismissed
their claim, holding that whites could not invoke the civil rights
laws against racial discrimination.41 The Supreme Court
unanimously disagreed in an opinion written by Justice Mar-
shall.419
The implications of the case for challenges to affirmative ac-
tion programs were clear; had McDonald come out differently,
whites would have no vehicle by which to challenge such pro-
grams. Justice Marshall's opinion contained a footnote
"emphasiz[ing] that we do not consider here the permissibility of
[affirmative action] ... program[s], whether judicially required
or otherwise prompted."4"' Justice Stevens wrote that, in his
opinion, "we are kidding ourselves.., to the [extent] that you
disavow consideration of a voluntary affirmative action program.
I agree that a judicially required program would not be covered,
but the reasoning in the text will surely support the typical
reverse discrimination claim, which any quota system will stim-
ulate."42" ' Marshall disagreed, denying that "a program which a
judge can lawfully require is necessarily illegal without a judge's
order."42
2
The distinction became crucial in Local Number 93, Interna-
tional Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,4 2' decided the
same day as Local 28. The case involved an affirmative action
program dealing with promotions, adopted as part of a consent
416. Local 28, 478 U.S. at 426.
417. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
418. Id. at 276-77.
419. Id. at 274.
420. Id. at 281 n.8.
421. Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Marshall (June 14, 1976), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 171, file 13.
422. Letter from Justice Marshall to Justice Stevens (June 15, 1976), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 171, file 13.
423. 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
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decree.424 Because it involved promotions, it fell between the
hiring preferences in Local 28, which Powell believed would not
"burden[]" whites "directly, if at all,"25 and the lay-off prefer-
ences in Wygant, because some whites might be adversely affect-
ed by affirmative action in promotions.
Here the key votes were from Justices Powell and O'Connor.
At the conference the outcome was not entirely clear, and Chief
Justice Burger retained some hope that he would get a majority
to hold the promotion preferences unconstitutional. Justices
O'Connor and Powell, though, found it crucial that the program
in Local 93 involved a court order, even a consent decree: "There
is a difference," Justice Powell wrote, "between the approval by
a court of an agreement between the parties, and an order of a
court that is contested by the employer." 2 As Powell under-
stood the record, this case did not involve a sweetheart deal in
which the employer simply rolled over and accepted the
employees' challenges. He remained uncertain about the proper
result, however, because he found the record unclear on whether
"non-minority members of the union will be discriminated
against in promotions." 27
After the Chief Justice decided that he had to vote to reverse
the court of appeals' approval of the program, Justice Brennan
took on the opinion himself.42 1 Justice Powell was uncomfort-
able with Brennan's draft and urged Brennan to make extensive
revisions .1 9 He wanted Brennan to emphasize that the case in-
volved only the interpretation of federal statutes, not the Consti-
tution.43 ° He also found inadequate Brennan's treatment of
precedents concerning a court's ability to order relief beyond
what a statute required in the absence of a court order."'
424. Id. at 506.
425. Local 28, 478 U.S. at 488.
426. Letter from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Burger (Mar. 6, 1986), Marshall
Papers, box 392, file 4.
427. Id.
428. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to Conference (Mar. 10, 1986), Mar-
shall Papers, box 392, file 4.
429. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (June 20, 1986), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 392, file 4.
430. Id.
431. Id.
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Brennan accepted the first set of suggestions but resisted the
second. However, when it appeared that he could not get the
crucial votes needed from Justices Powell and O'Connor, he
modified his opinion again,43' and Justices Powell and
O'Connor immediately joined.33
When the Court upheld a judicial order requiring one-for-one
promotions of whites and African-Americans in the Alabama
state police, Justice Brennan again wrote the lead opinion.4
To secure Justice Powell's vote, Brennan relied heavily on
Powell's opinions in Wygant and Local 28. The effect, as Justice
Stevens stated, was to suggest that Wygant's strict approach
"should be applied in reviewing a judicial decree entered in
response to a proven violation of law."43 5 Stevens thought, in
contrast, that "[violuntary race-conscious decisions by employ-
ers... [weire presumptively unlawful."436 Relying on Swann,
Justice Stevens said that "[tlhe burden of demonstrating that
the relief granted by the district court is excessive rests squarely
on the law violator-not on the victim of the wrongdoing."
4 3
As the law of affirmative action developed, apparently the
inside story is that there is no real inside story. The discussions
within the Court simply identify the lines that the Justices
wrote into the law in their published opinions. Of course there
were disagreements, both between majority and dissenters and
within the majorities. There also were disputes over how much
one or another aspect of a particular case ought to be empha-
sized. Finally, there were occasional "strategic" votes and draft
opinions, as in the Alabama police case, where a Justice may
have shaped an opinion to obtain votes rather than to express
his or her most deeply held views. In the end, nothing went on
inside the Court that the published opinions do not fairly reflect.
432. Justice Brennan, Third and Fourth Revised Drafts (Local 93 v. City of Cleve-
land) (June 22, 26, 1986), Marshall Papers, box 392, file 4.
433. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (June 26, 1986), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 392, file 3; Letter from Justice O'Connor to Justice Brennan (June 26,
1986), Marshall Papers, box 392, file 3.
434. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
435. Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan (Dec. 12, 1986), Marshall Pa-
pers, box 415, file 1.
436. Id.
437. Id.
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E. Coda
The Court's divisions over the standard of review to apply to
affirmative action seemed to end in Croson. Five Justices agreed
that affirmative action programs had to meet the stringent stan-
dards of strict scrutiny.43 Or so it seemed.
A year later the Court decided Metro Broadcasting Inc. v.
FCC.413 The conference discussion revealed a narrow majority
to uphold a program mandated by Congress, giving preference in
awarding broadcast licenses to minority firms. Justice White,
who had joined the plurality opinion in Croson, voted to uphold
the program. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion. In light of
Croson, he believed it necessary to write an opinion applying
strict scrutiny to the program."' When Justice White received
the draft opinion, though, he told Justice Brennan that he did
not believe it appropriate to use strict scrutiny in evaluating
federal affirmative action programs. In his view, Fullilove rather
than Croson was the key case.
Surprised but pleased by Justice White's position, Justice
Brennan immediately began rewriting the draft opinion." 1 The
revisions were, as Justice O'Connor put it, "surprisingly exten-
sive." "' Instead of strict scrutiny, the test was to be a version
of intermediate scrutiny drawn from the Fullilove opinions by
Burger and Marshall. The law of affirmative action remained as
unsettled at the end of Marshall's tenure as it had been when
the question first arose.
438. Justice Scalia refused to join the portions of Justice O'Connor's plurality opin-
ion that suggested some ways to satisfy strict scrutiny that he believed would up-
hold affirmative action programs too frequently. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
439. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
440. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion (Metro Broadcasting v. FCC), Marshall Papers,
box 508, file 8.
441. Justice Brennan, Revised Draft Opinion (Metro Broadcasting v. FCC) (June 15,
1990), Marshall Papers, box 508, file 9.
442. Letter from Justice O'Connor to Conference (June 18, 1990), Marshall Papers,
box 508, file 9.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Marshall's papers demonstrate that the Court's pub-
lished opinions provide rather good indications of the Justices'
concerns in race discrimination cases. Perhaps in some instances
it would take a particularly well-informed scholar of constitu-
tional law to discern the residues of internal discussions in the
published opinions."4 Particularly in cases that the Justices
understood to be the first in a long series that they would have
to decide, at times the published opinions concealed divisions
that surfaced as the line of cases developed. On the whole, how-
ever, the Justices tended to state positions to their colleagues in
"tentative" opinions, and then to modify those positions only
slightly, ordinarily in essentially stylistic ways, as the Court's
deliberations continued. In short, on issues of race discrimina-
tion there seems to have been little collegial interchange among
the Justices during Marshall's tenure. As Justice Powell stated
in a memorandum in Bakke, the Court's conference discussions
were "usually] truncated."' The fact that Chief Justice Bur-
ger personally approached Justice Powell three times in Bakke,
trying to persuade Powell to abandon his approval of Harvard-
type programs that took race into account, and failed three
times, says something about Burger's persuasive abilities, but it
also shows that the interactions that mattered were those re-
corded on paper."
The material presented in this Article may contribute to an
emerging picture of the modern Supreme Court as bureaucratic
rather than collegial, and perhaps may similarly help modify our
understanding of the Court's operation. It ought not, however,
change our understanding of constitutional law.
443. I hope to explore that question in an essay on Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982), and its treatment in my earlier essay, Mark V. Tushnet, The Optimist's Tale,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1257 (1984).
444. SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 110.
445. Id. at 118.
